

TRANSCRIPT

## Defense Writers Group

A Project of the Center for Media & Security  
New York and Washington, D.C.

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April 26, 2006

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Q: You just got back from a trip to Iraq about a week ago. I wonder if you'd take a few minutes here and give us some of your impressions from the trip, both our guys and their guys.

A: I'd be glad to. I actually got back Saturday. I spent--quite a compressed trip. We spent about six days on the road, but we crammed a lot into that.

As most of you know, I think I've talked with you before about it, I try to get into both Iraq and Afghanistan about every quarter, about every 90 days, so I get kind of snapshots, personal snapshots in between the reports that I get, et cetera, and talking to our leaders over there.

This time I started in Baghdad and focused really obviously on the senior leadership and got some good updates there both with General Casey and General Corelli and the division commanders, got around and saw a lot of soldiers, reenlisted a lot of soldiers. Morale is very good. But I also wanted to focus on what we're doing with the Iraqi army because last Christmas I spent a considerable amount of time with the 6th Iraqi Division in Baghdad and they had assumed about 60 percent of responsibility for the Baghdad battle space.

This time I focused on the 9th Division which is the only mechanized division, which is inherently more complex in terms of what it takes to train, sustain, et cetera. So we spent some time there. And quite frankly, I was very impressed. I was impressed with their leadership. I was impressed with what they've done to pull themselves together. What they've done on their own initiative to improve and develop their equipment, how they've integrated the equipment. For instance, Hungary had given them T-72 tanks. They have on their own initiative gone around the country and scrounged parts and all kinds of things to pull their own fleets together and done very well to accelerate their own preparation.

I spent some time at the Coin Academy which is a counterinsurgency academy that has been established over there. As you know, we've tried to tie it very closely to what we're doing at Fort Leavenworth under Dave Petraeus so that we're developing a coherent and cohesive preparation for our people on counterinsurgency. Of course the Coin Academy in Iraq is focused on Iraqi insurgency which is not exactly the same as Afghan insurgency which is not the same as Salvadoran insurgency that we've got experience in or Vietnam. They're all different. But there are some principles and there are some things that we want to ground people in. So I was interested in seeing that we were pulling together a coherent doctrinal base that we are infusing into our professional education and our training as we go forward.

I then went to Afghanistan. Typically I would stop in Pakistan or some place and see my counterparts there.

By the way, before I leave Iraq, I did meet with my counterpart in Iraq, General Qatar, and took a look at how that headquarters is coming together and how they are actually now mirroring us in terms of pulling together operation centers. They're actually managing operations and they're developing situation awareness of the battle space that their forces occupy, and they're actually participating inside of General Casey and General Corelli's command and control structure, which is impressive.

There's a long way to go, no question, but I'm impressed with the potential of these people in terms of the complexity of their capabilities.

Afghanistan, a very similar time. Time with Carl Eikenberry over there, Bob Durbin who is running the equivalent of what Marty Dempsey's doing in Iraq in training the Afghan National Army.

My view is, because of the fact that now governance has gotten considerable traction in Afghanistan, the efforts that we're making with the ministries is also getting traction so that the support systems, the personnel system logistics and all these kinds of things in fact are falling in place.

I've met with my counterpart there, General Mizmullah, which is actually the fourth meeting I've had with him now in six months. I met with him twice in Afghanistan. I met with him twice here in the United States. And very very, I don't know if any of you have met him before, but he's a very aggressive, outgoing guy, a lot of charisma.

It was interesting, we had a little dinner and he had several of his former enemies at the table now that are now in the government with him, and they have quite an interesting synergy going on there in terms of--This isn't the first place I've seen this, by the way. This is not unlike seeing the FMLM sitting at the table with El Salvador, FSLN in Nicaragua. You can name it. This is what happens.

I met with General DelVeccio who is the Italian commander of ISAF, and as you know, ISAF now is assuming control of the third piece, the third phase--three of four--which basically focuses us in terms of the operational entity in the northeast quadrant.

I met with the Afghan commander there that's operating with the 10th Mountain Division. And probably the highlight of my whole trip, because it takes me back to what I'm most used to. We flew into the Konar Valley during Operation Mountain Lion--actually on the same piece of terrain that, remember when we had the big fight and we lost a SEAL and a helicopter and all that up there?

Q: The Shah-i-Kot Valley?

A: Yeah, and we actually went out on the same mountain. They had blown out a single ship LZ and we landed up there and got out. Mountain Lion was going on. It was actually an integrated operation with Afghan national forces, 10th Mountain Division elements, Marines, interagency, State was present, CIA, the whole deal. Special Forces. Very very well orchestrated, integrated effort right there in the middle of Taliban country, which I almost went AWOL. I almost sent the helicopters away, I think I'll stay. [Laughter].

It's a beautiful area. Afghanistan to me is beautiful, when you compare it to Iraq and the topography of Iraq. So I was very impressed with that. And impressed with the progress that they're making there.

Overall I had a very positive trip. I do believe that we're making progress. The snapshots I get tend to give me a little bit of contrast between each of the trips. I generally feel very good about it.

Q: Do you think the trend line is up?

A: I think it is. I think that a huge thing that occurred actually as we were coming back was the settling of the issue of governance in Iraq. I think if that gets traction similar to what we got in Afghanistan we will see very similar trends in terms of formalizing the support structures that are required to help sustain the Iraqi forces and the investment we've made in training and standing them up.

I'll give you very quickly, I'm probably, I probably anticipate that we're going to have to be a lot more patient than people probably have a tendency to want to be. I go back, and you've probably heard this before, but I go back very quickly historically and look at our own experience. The 13 years it took us to get a constitution. And the Civil War we fought 80 years later to correct what was not satisfied in the constitution. And then the 80 years later that it took us to get a Civil Rights Act, which was the law that did it. I'm not sure I anticipate it to take that big of a timeline, but it could. This is the nature of this stuff. I think it's kind of disingenuous in many respects for

people to be too impatient when our own experience, and we're fairly sophisticated people.

In fact I was talking to General Devereaux yesterday at Army War College. We're running Unified Quest, which is a huge exercise up there. He reminded me that the United Kingdom achieved women's suffrage in 1921 which he said was fundamental to a real democracy. That gives you a little bit of a timeline. Their timeline's a little longer than ours is.

I'll quit on that and be glad to answer, follow up, whatever you want.

Q: Joint Cargo Aircraft. What's the current state of play on that? They just moved back the time for the reply to CRNT by three weeks--

A: The Joint Cargo Aircraft.

Q: The Army and the Air Force, do front line supply.

A: You say what is the state of play on it?

Q: Yeah. Because they've just moved back by three weeks the time to replace for replies from the contractors, and I wondered if you guys were reassessing what you wanted in that airplane, if you were anticipating there were going to be new and different players, has the concept expanded? Any change in what you wanted, the direction you're going on that?

A: Not to my knowledge. I'm largely out of the acquisition business in terms of how it operates, but in terms of the requirement for the Joint Cargo Aircraft, originally this was part of the reprogramming of the Comanche, because we knew we needed--We have to replace the Sherpas, we have to provide for instance the National Guard with an aircraft to perform the kinds of things they need for homeland security as well as the short takeoff and landing capabilities we need. It's less than a C-130 capability in its traditional sense, but greater than what we can put in a helicopter. So that's fundamentally the void that we were trying to fill.

The Air Force came on board late in this process and said we think we might have a very similar requirement. So the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and I agreed that what we would do is examine the possibility of making this a joint program, and we did. So what we've done is come to what I think is pretty much resolution about where we have a great deal of commonality here. We are the leader of the Joint Program Office, the Air Force is the Deputy. As far as I know, the RFP went out several weeks ago and I don't know of any change to--

Q: They gave them three more weeks to reply, and my impression is that part of this reflected General Cody's enthusiasm for, or maybe his envy in Washington in the Marine Corps KC-130s during the dance in 2003, resupplying the Marines and keeping them moving by landing on the highways, bringing in fuel, ammunition and things they needed to keep going, and that he would like to see a similar capability for the Army.

A: That's the first I've heard it. General Cody and I have served together a long time. He used to work for me. We used to deal in short takeoff and landing aircraft. I doubt seriously whether seeing the Marines land C-130s on the highways has a hell of a lot to do with it.

I think what we've got is we want to relieve an extraordinary pressure that we've got on Chinooks doing things that we could do with short takeoff and landing fixed wing. What we want to do is fill that niche, and fill the niche because if you take a look at it we've got the possibility here of replacing a wide range. We've got C-12 aircraft, we've got a variety of other kinds of things that this aircraft if properly selected could fill these niches with a common aircraft.

We also discussed with the Air Force a possibility of collocation of our Army National Guard aircraft with Air National Guard aircraft in the states and get leverage on such things as logistics and the rest of it.

That's an interesting story and maybe it's true, but I don't--

Q: So as far as you know there is no renewed interest in a bit larger aircraft than the--

A: I think what we laid out is the requirement and I think the RFP is sufficient and we're going to see what comes back in. It may be a larger aircraft, I don't know. I think it's a pretty broad aperture for people to shoot through.

Q: You've placed a high priority on getting active protection systems to the current force as soon as possible. Can the Army afford to wait four or five years for a system out of the FCS program when there's a current solution, an interim solution available.

A: What is--

Q: Trophy. As part of the Army's full spectrum effects platform which is known as Sheriff. Came in at a critical means statement out of theater last year.

A: How do we know this is the solution? Because the manufacturer says it is?

Q: That's what the [inaudible] mentions. They funded it with \$31 million in January. Lately the Army's basically said we're going to wait, we don't want the system.

Are you aware of the system?

A: I'm aware of a wide variety of systems that we're doing to include with some other partners. What we are interested in is making sure that what we provide to our soldiers works. What we have found is traditionally a lot of people make claims about things that work that have not been

tested, that we don't want to go that path.

If you take a look at the rapid fielding initiative and the rapid equipping the force initiative, I don't think the evidence indicates that we want to delay things that could help soldiers. But I think what we do want to do is make sure that what we put our precious dollars against work. The manufacturer's claims don't tend to be the way that we judge things. We like to test them.

Q: This system has been in development for ten years in Israel, for the Israeli Defense Force. It was tested, demo'd, a couple of weeks ago.

A: I've seen it in Israel. I've been there.

Q: It's been tested quite a bit and the proof is there.

A: Are the Israelis fielding it?

Q: It's in development for their force.

A: Do they have--

Q: I just thought I would throw that out. So you're not impressed with the system then.

A: I didn't say I wasn't impressed. I say what we want to do is we want to see it work and we want to have confidence that it will work. We don't have, as you know, we have a fiscal environment that we have to be precise about what it is--This is going to be something we're going to fly against the whole force. What we don't want to do is to run down a path that isn't, that hasn't demonstrated stability to do things. So my mind's open on it. To say that we're against it I think is wrong. I think that what we are for is rapidly placing things that are proven on the force so that we know what we're given.

Q: Sir, we hear a lot about the networked force and how much it's going to help once you get all these networking programs out into the field. But it also seems like there's a reluctance to field some of these things as they become available. WIN-T, for example is this com on the move, fancy thing, which appears to be testing well, and appears to be getting good recommendations, and if anything appears to be on a slower deployment schedule than it was before. While Joint Network Node, the precursor, is getting cut.

What's your sense of these things? Are they ever going to make it to the field? Are they seen as a threat to FCS? Why aren't these things getting into the field faster?

A: They're fundamental to FCS. And Network Node is not being cut. Joint Network Node, we ran as fast and as hard as we could. In fact if you take a look at what's fielded now in Iraq and Afghanistan, you'll find that they're all Joint Network Node enabled. But Joint Network Node

was an interim solution to better solution which would be WIN-T. But there are things that have to be developed and overcome in WIN-T that give us the coms on the move kinds of capability that we need.

If you take a look at what we fielded now, just take a look at Iraq. We had one division in the United States Army there years ago that had bandwidth that was sufficient to move stuff. That was the 4th Infantry Division which is the first division that we digitized. It had four to six megabytes of band width available at the division headquarters level.

Today we have moved that much band width down to battalion and company level through Joint Network Node. What Joint Network Node does not give us is full coms on the move with that kind of thing. WIN-T is to give us that kind of band width on the move.

Now let me back up in history just a minute. The United States Army had a \$100 billion shortfall in procurement during the decade of the '90s. \$100 billion shortfall. If you take a look at the Army's percentage of the total DoD procurement from 1990 to 2005, and you can go check these numbers, DoD had \$1.9 trillion worth of investment in that 15 year period. The United States Army got 16 percent of it. Sixteen percent. Defense agencies got 15 percent. United States Navy got 33 percent. United States Air Force got 36 percent.

So when we crossed the berm to go to war the United States Army went to war exactly like it has traditionally in World War II, in Korea and everywhere else. Short. Short equipment by a tune of \$56 billion. One of the places that we were short was in coms. Over 110,000 radios short and no capability for coms on the move. We had an MSC architecture that was basically a cell tower type architecture that did not allow you to fight on the move unless you're in a very small sandbox like NTC. This is just one of the areas we have problems. So what did we have to do when we went to war? We had to do a thin fielding of a thing called Blue Force Tracker and we had to go to single channel TacSat which had been fielding SOF forces ever since--By the way, last night was the 26th anniversary of when we stood in the desert at Desert 1. I was on that mission. And we talked out of there on single channel TacSat 26 years ago, on an [Earth] 101 radio which is a low powered UHF radio, to the President. That's 26 years ago. We fielded in 2003, the United States Army, some single channel TacSats so that they could move to Baghdad. It's directly related to the under-resourcing of the United States Army on this.

So now we are trying to get a comprehensive system fielded that gives us the kind of operational situational awareness and gives us the kind of networking necessary for us to be effective on the battlefield that we're on. And when I'm in Afghanistan and Iraq and everywhere else, every commander tells me they've never had the situational awareness that they've go today, and it's so important. The way you are able to optimize your force is through anticipation of mobility and you get that through situational awareness. Otherwise what you have to do is try to be strong everywhere, and you can't. So I'm giving you a lot of background.

Q: So what's with WIN-T? Why isn't it ready?

A: I can't give you all the technical reasons, but what I can tell you is it's got apparently a ways to go before it's going to be ready.

Q: Because they had these tests at I think Fort Huachuca and we got a lot of briefings from the Army and--

A: But WIN-T is not just an Army system, it's a joint system. So it's got to meet the Air Force's requirement, the Navy's requirement, the Marine's requirement, the OSD requirement. WIN-T is a backdrop, a transport [inaudible]. It's a big piece of the detail. I don't know all of the technical reasons but I know that it's important enough to us that we've got to get it right. JTRS and everything else that's moving is going to be, is going to have to ride on that.

Q: Let me just make it very clear to everybody. The United States Army is not turning its back on anything that can help us. Okay? What we're not going to buy is, we're not going down to the used car place and listening to the salesman and believe everything he tells us. [Laughter]. We want to see it work. We want to make sure that what we're committing to is going to fulfill the requirement of what we're going to do. Those things that we can field rapidly to make a big difference to us we will do and we will do incrementally, but something like what you're talking about is such a huge investment, and we've got to get it right. Not only are we talking about voices passing on this, but we're talking about intel passing on it, but you're also talking about our systems riding on it. In other words, our robotics are going to ride on it, our munitions are going to ride on it. You're talking about precision munitions. You're talking about smart munitions and all of these other kinds of things that we're fielding. They're going to ride on this network and it has to be right.

Q: I can see why you'd rather be in Afghanistan. [Laughter]. Julian Barnes.

Q: There have been some continuing security problems in Afghanistan at the Bagram base with stolen flash drives that contain sensitive or classified information. I was wondering if you could A, compare the security situation you've just seen at the Iraq bases with the Afghan bases and say why it's a little different; and two, I want to know if you think it's too easy these days for well-meaning officers to copy classified information onto a flash drive which can be stolen by a local national and maybe jeopardize informants or other security--

A: First of all, I think this is a huge reality of today's world. It's just a reality. Information today is packaged in ways that are so non-traditional, people in many respects don't understand all of the implications of the way information is packaged. The impact of cell phones, cell phones that take pictures, miniature videos, all of the stuff that is there to include things like thumb drives, flash drives and all this other kind of stuff, which are great innovations, also have tremendous liabilities associated with them.

So number one, I'm not surprised that this is a challenge. Number two, we've been working very

hard to educate the force, to develop policies, to make sure that everybody understands what the vulnerabilities of all this happen to be.

So I'm kind of not surprised by it. I'm frustrated that we're not getting a better handle on it and we're working very hard to do so. But again, I always compare stuff to the wind in Wyoming, and I call Wyoming home. The wind's going to blow whether you like it or not. There are some things you can do like grow trees to break it, you can build a wind shed to break it. There are all kinds of things you might be able to do, but fundamentally you're not going to stop it from blowing.

So what we've got to do is we've got to learn and develop and evolve in such a way that we understand what it is that we're doing here. I'm afraid the technology is always going to be a step ahead of our practices.

Do you think Bagram's the only place in the world that's got this problem? Do you think your newspaper's got this problem? Do you think IBM's got this problem? How about General Dynamics? Everybody's got this problem. The privacy issues of doctors. This is a huge problem with this age. That's why information is such an important element of national power. It's not just the media. It's not just public diplomacy. It's not just stolen thumb drives. It is the whole thing.

And by the way, its susceptibility to manipulation. You don't have a clue who put the stuff on the thumb drives or on those thumb drives [inaudible]. And there's all kinds of opportunity for other people to put things on those things that they would like to see on those things to cause all kinds of--You can let your imagination run wild.

Q: So the solution is not to restrict the technology, but get people to think hey, before you copy it onto the flash drive--

A: Of course. What technology have we absorbed into--You don't put your family cat in the microwave, right? [Laughter]. We seem to have learned that. [Laughter].

Q: the dress uniform. Can you talk a little bit about why you made that decision?

A: Which decision are you talking about? [Laughter].

Q: Consolidating the dress uniforms into a single--

A: I haven't made the decision yet.

Q: You have not made the decision?

A: Not yet. I'm considering it. What I've got the Sergeant Major of the Army and others and the leadership looking at is how can we do several things. One is reduce the insane amount of

uniforms that we've got. Number two, in doing so, how can we insulate ourselves against fads influencing the way our uniforms appear. In other words, go to a traditional kind of a thing. More importantly probably is how do we reduce the cost to the soldier on the uniform? The tremendous amount of money it takes for a soldier to sew things on uniforms, launder uniforms, press them and all this stuff.

As you can tell in this Army combat uniform what we've tried to do is reduce--A soldier issued four sets of these, if he had to sew all the stuff on, spends almost \$200. Then he spends, now it's up in some places as high as \$67 a set to get them laundered and starched. This is insane to do that when we've got the technology today to provide a better, more comfortable uniform that you can launder, that you can dry like you do in the field and we can accept the fact that there's not rigid creases in it and spitshine on the boots. I mean we've made these boots so you can't shine them. And I've told the NCOs in the Army, the first one I catch shining them--[Laughter]--is going to have a problem.

You laugh, but in my father's Army we had buckskin boots and those old NCOs took old dog tag chains and figured out how to take the edge off of the boots and shine them. This is nuts. [Laughter]. So we're trying to do that.

The second thing is, we have all of these other variations of uniforms that it just occurred to me that it would make sense for us to go to a traditional uniform that we could take the cost out of having so many and we could put some of that money into providing a soldier a really sharp uniform they'd be very proud of that was of high quality. So that's what we're--

Q: [Inaudible].

A: I'm not screwing around with it just to have bad dreams about it. As we take a look to, as I get all the input in and we figure out exactly what this will end up being, which we're probably closer to than we were yesterday, then I'll make that decision.

Q: Weeks, months?

A: It will happen before I leave as the Chief of staff.

Q: General, you talk about the need for patience in Iraq, that that was examples you gave that were really [inaudible]. Talk about the need for military patience, how there's a drumbeat in this town of when do we withdraw, what timetable, you know.

A: These things are political. You know that.

Q: Everything is.

A: If you'll allow me, one of the things that I think most people are very confused about is the

difference in a war and in battle. They're not synonymous. You can be at war and never fight a battle. Right? And you can have a lot of battles and not be at war. War is a legal state of belligerency. War is a legal term and it's got to do, quite frankly, with politics. It's got to do with all of the elements of national power, not just the military piece of it.

This war that we're in and this situation we've got is highly political and as World War II was, as everything else when you get into this.

So I think we've got both a political timetable which will drive the military. That's just the way it is.

So I think we're fairly resolved on the military side to understand that this is going to take time. I think the town here's got its own drumbeat that, and quite frankly I'm not part of but our political leaders are, that will determine what it is we're asked to do.

My preference as a soldier would be that we do this correctly and we set the expectations in such a way that we make sure that we do what's right by the investment we've made. Which means I believe we should set some expectations of greater patience and we should go through the conditions that have been laid out and make sure that when this is over we've done the very best we can to give both the Iraqis and the Afghan people the ability to move forward in self-determination, however that may manifest itself. Which I'm convinced won't be Jeffersonian democracy. It will be culturally attuned to the way they are.

Q: In terms of the requirement for a steady U.S. presence, the fact is the Iraqi units that have been doing well have heavy embeds of U.S. soldiers. And virtually all of the combat service support are still U.S. and are likely to remain so for quite a long time, is it not?

A: Well, the advisors that we've got inside these Iraqi units now provide a valuable function, but what I observed these units are operating pretty well on their own in their own culture. We're not exactly talking about having to orchestrate joint fighters against the Soviet second echelon. This is a world that they understand. The things the Iraqi forces, for instance, in Iraq bring to the table is extraordinary understanding and knowledge of the area that they're operating, they understand the people, they understand the nuances. It's quite powerful.

So where our advisors are there and helping them do certain things, I think what we're transitioning to is more in the sustainment. That does not mean that we're carrying their water and their chow and their fuel and all to them necessarily and that we'll have to do that forever, but it does mean that we have to set the systems up so that they understand how to do it. How to pay, how to administer the personnel records, and those kinds of things. That's what the minister is setting up, MOD, MOI and all the rest of it are all about. That will take some time yet.

Having a government in place is going to help us because when that gets in place, as I said in Afghanistan, there will be some commitment through the systems that are in place.

I think we'll be there. I think we will have advisors with both Afghan and Iraqi Army for some time to come and I think rightfully so. We've had advisors with the Korean Army for years and years and years. And in other places. It just makes sense.

My view is what we ought to be focused on is how long will a major troop presence, and I'm talking about units, be necessary. I think that's condition based and I think we're moving in a direction that we very likely could see a reduction in troop presence if these conditions remain. Which would suit me okay. It would suit most of us.

Q: What in your mind are the main conditions that have to be met before you can talk about, people always say condition based, but I'd like to hear you talk about what the conditions are.

A: I would rather not put words in George Casey's mouth. I'd as soon that he did that, because it really is not just purely military conditions. They really are the conditions that have a great political edge to it. And I'm talking about now in Iraq. It's going to have a lot to do with governance, it's going to have a lot to do with infrastructure, the whole thing coming together.

From the military perspective I think what we will do is we will move at the initiative of what the full mil situation allows over there.

Q: Sir, you've been traveling. There was a lot of excitement in this town about a handful of generals who have asked for Secretary Rumsfeld's resignation. Two of those generals were Army division commanders in Iraq. A lot of us have never seen anything quite like this, and even a lot of us who have been around here quite a while covering the military.

Put it in context for us. Did you see this coming? Were these frustrations, a lot of us pick up similar frustrations in Army ranks among the officer corps about how things have been handled in Iraq, about the troop levels, et cetera. And do you find it unprecedented, unhelpful, helpful, what?

A: I would prefer to talk about it from my own perspective.

My view is, let me put it this way. I was retired and you didn't see me doing it. I didn't agree with everything in the previous administration that went on. My personal view is it's inappropriate. I just think it's inappropriate. I'll just leave it at that.

I know all of these officers, by the way. The important thing I think is to remember that in our country there's a very very strong tradition and a requirement for the military to be subordinated to civilians. When we take the oath of office we swear an oath to the Constitution, not to individuals. This is different than some other places. Therefore, we have a responsibility to remember that. The Constitution places civil authority over the military.

Again, speaking from my own perspective, if I thought what those officers were saying were true, I wouldn't be here. If that was my experience, I would not be here. It is not my experience. But that does not mean to say that--First of all, I offer a lot of military advice. It is not always in agreement with everything, but I wouldn't expect it to be. That's why we have multiple advisors to the leadership. I have never not been heard. I can't say I've always been agreed with. But I will tell you--and just take a look at the transformation of the Army. All of these transformational things that we're doing were our initiative. The Army Modular Force was our initiative that we took forth to the leadership and said this is how we think we should move into the future. We got a commitment out of them and they fulfilled it.

The Comanche decision was an Army initiative. I struggled with that one a lot. It was my idea. I went to them with this and we discussed it and made a decision and they supported it. That was military advice. Of course my lane is Title 10 and organize, train and equip the force. The restructuring of the FCS. Nobody dictated those things. Nobody dictated those things. And it's largely incorrect to equate any of these things with things like Crusader and some of the other kinds of stories, which I was here for so I can't do.

My experience has been that military advice was given, accepted, argued over, received in some cases, and when received has been supported.

I cannot speak to 2002 and 2003 or 2001 because I wasn't here. So I trust those guys to make their own judgment on what occurred.

But I think it's unfair to paint everybody as though we're not doing our job, because we are. And I think it's probably inappropriate for military officers who have been in positions of trust to do. That's my personal opinion.

Q: One level of frustration, and clearly it does go to some decisions you've made, is the size of the force. You've got units going back for their third and in some cases fourth tours in Iraq or Afghanistan in the next rotation cycle. The military's the exact same size it was before 9/11 basically, as is the Army. You had your 30,000 plus-up that a lot of us thought would probably be permanent that has turned out to be temporary.

A: That's not true. I think that's a very simplistic view. We have over 600,000 soldiers on active duty today. We have a million people in uniform. Some of them, a little more than half of them are in the reserve components. They're there for a reason. We've made the investment in them for a reason. That's to use when we need to surge.

I will tell you that we've been at this war longer than World War II already. What percentage of the Army has deployed? The answer is 52 percent.

Q: You're having a hard time tapping into that other 48 percent.

A: We put ten brigades in the war in the last rotation. No, we're not having a hard time tapping in. We're trying to be prudent because these people are citizen soldiers and they've got other lives.

I asked for the surge last time to buy time so I could generate more active force by modularizing the force. It was to buy time.

If you take a look at what we've got over there now, we have two brigades of National Guard involved in it. Now we still have on balance in the force, as I've told you before, we had over 100,000 spaces we had to rebalance to generate--The five most deployed MOSes in the United States Army, only one of them is a combat MOS. That's 11-Bravo. Infantry. We're creating a lot more infantry. The others are 31-Bravo, which are communicators; 88-Mike which is your truck drivers; 63-Bravo which are your mechanics; 91-Whiskey which is medics. So those are mechanics, truck drivers, communicators, and medics. That's the most deployed. But that represents 31 percent of what we're deploying.

If the Army were balanced, their chance of going back is about 30 percent. So I disagree with you. We don't have large units that are back on their fourth trip. Special Forces is going in and out on multiple trips because they're doing four month tours.

Q: There will be a lot of third--

A: We have the people on their second tour right now. We have the 3rd Infantry Division that's had two. We've got the 101st on its second. 4th ID on its second one. By the way, they did not have full one-year tours before. 1st Cavalry Division has had one tour, and we're modularizing these units now so that they're different, more capable, and all the rest of it.

By the way, we're not into our 37th brigade that we've modularized to some level out of the 70 that we're trying to create. So this is about taking the investment we already have and making more of it.

The second thing is, one of the very first things I did was go to the Secretary of Defense and the President and asked to grow the Army. You know that. Congress has come up and kind of policed up behind us and said yeah, okay we agree with you, kind of a thing. It doesn't really matter except that we have been doing this now since 2003, 2004 actually. The first quarter of 2004 if you're talking about fiscal quarters. And we've grown about half of that. But the message is in what I just said. We've grown about half of it in three years.

So when we cut the Army like we did in the decade of the '90s by \$500,000 soldiers, people have got to remember that you don't turn around and pop them back. This isn't something you just throw water on the ground and soldiers pop out of the ground. It's hard.

And let me just talk about another thing. In our country right now, our primary market's 17-24

year olds, males. That's our primary market. Only 3 out of 10 males in that age group are eligible to come in our armed forces under the standards we've got. Two percent of that population is in prison; about 23 percent cannot make the medical and moral cut; four percent have served or are serving; and about 41 percent are not high school graduates or can't pass the deal. So that leaves us three out of ten, 30 percent.

Half of that 30 percent are in college, which means that 1.5 out of 10 in this country are providing us 49 percent of our soldiers.

Now we are enlisting every year, every year, 175,000 soldiers. That is the equivalent of the United States Marine Corps. Every year that's what the United States Army brings on active, Guard and Reserve. We are reenlisting over 100,000 soldiers a year. This is no small enterprise.

So when you've got that kind of demand for soldiers and you've got that kind of a base that you're competing for, it is not easy. And so if somebody told me right now you can have 100,000 more soldiers and grow the army back to 780,000, how many decades would it take us to do so? This is largely an argument that is an emotional argument that has no people that understand what the hell they're talking about. The Army is over 600,000 on active duty because we have grown some of the Army, as I've just said, with 30,000 to 40,000, and because we have mobilized reserves, which we should, because that's why they're there.

The second thing is, inside the Army we are transforming to attempt to grow inside the operational piece of the Army an additional 40,000 soldiers. In other words, people that are doing things in uniform that don't have to be done by people in uniform.

One of the things that we're doing is stabilizing the Army through unit manning and stability of our units and going into a unit rotation model. That takes a lot of people out of the transient account.

We were averaging over 67,000 soldiers in motion in the Army that were not in units that were just PCSing between jobs. Nobody would do that in business. So we're stabilizing that, trying to get some out. We have a lot of people in the institutional side that run the day to day business of the Army that we do not need soldiers in uniform doing. We're trying to migrate them inside the operational force.

So we have a multitude of things that we are doing. We're getting better access to the Reserves. We're trying to grow the operational force. And we're trying to grow the top line of the Army. We've got authority to do it all the way out to 2011, 2013. We will make a decision out there whether or not we need to keep what we've grown.

But in the fiscal environment we're in, I'd just remind you, all the spirals for FCS over this next decade, four spirals, are about \$9 billion. That same \$9 billion would buy us, at \$1.5 billion, how many soldiers does that buy us? If it costs you \$1.5 billion for 10,000 soldiers a year, what's it

buy you? See, it buys you 30,000 soldiers for two years. So that's what we would trade. We would trade all of our modernization for two years worth of 30,000. And that's the fundamental realities of where we are.

People that sit here and act like we're idiots with clown hats on and don't understand what the realities are here, as though this was simple, don't understand the realities are what we've faced.

So my personal view is and nobody's asked me yet, but what are we going to do when we get to fiscal pressures? My answer has been, and this is what I briefed the Congress, is we're going to fund the Army, we're going to 100 percent man, 100 percent equip, 100 percent readiness. And whatever the government of the United States gives us to do it will be the size of the Army. If we get cut, we're going to cut the size of the Army. It will get smaller, but it's going to be ready. Or they'll get somebody with a different idea.

Q: General, I read a while ago that you're taking more and more Category 4s, enlisting more and more Category 4s. So I went and took the [AZBAT] to see how hard that is, and I flunked. [Laughter]. So I don't know what that says about the state of your press corps or your Cat 4--

A: What did you flunk?

Q: I couldn't do the math. I could not do the math. Anyway, I don't want to go into my personal-- [Laughter].

What I wanted to ask you was, I've been going back also and reading predictions by various people in Washington a year ago that if this OpTempo kept up the Army would be broken in a year. It's a year and it's not broken. I've been trying to figure out why that's so, and it seems to be, one key reason seems to be the health of the NCO corps.

So I wanted to ask you this morning whether you see any danger signs in your NCO corps, that they are wearing out, and if so what you're doing about it.

A: I don't see any danger signs about them wearing out. I don't think it's just the NCO corps. I think we've got a great officer corps. I think we've got great soldiers.

I was in a broken Army, or an Army that was pretty close to being broken. Maybe you served in it too, I don't know. Anybody in the Army in the late '60s, early '70s? I know what an Army that's near broken smells like, what it looks like, how it acts. Drug problems, race problems, insubordination, all kinds of things going on. We're nowhere near anything like that. In fact the 3rd Infantry Division just came back out of Baghdad on their second one-year tour with 136 percent reenlistment. I reenlisted soldiers right and left over here. They're reenlisting for six year. Dick Cody was over there, I was over there at Christmas time and reenlisted a bunch of soldiers, he reenlisted a bunch in January and he said the average was 5.5 years. Soldiers don't reenlist for that length of time of their life at that age without some confidence that they're reenlisting into

something that is of value.

I told you the story before I think about Staff Sergeant Barr. I took him to the Congress and showed him off. He was on his second one-year tour with the 3rd Infantry Division. He was wounded last April, 133 holes in him. He was hit with an RPG. He had 133 holes in him. And he fought his way back and rejoined his unit in November. I was with them in December. We reenlisted 100 percent of his squad over there.

I asked those kids, why are you reenlisting now and why here? They said because of Staff Sergeant Barr. We want to be like Staff Sergeant Barr. This is real. These kids are extraordinary kids that we have. This is an Army that is like none I've ever seen.

I told you, my father was in the Army before me for 32 years. He was in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam. I was commissioned 37 years ago. My brother's in over 30 years. None of us have ever seen an Army as good as this Army we've got right now. And it is the essence of what a volunteer Army can be. They get it. I don't think you can just say it's any one piece of it that makes a difference.

We issued, as a matter of fact we're sitting right now, I think the active Army is over 104 percent right now of its yearly glide slope on enlistment. Everybody's over 100 percent of their slope.

You say we're bringing in more Cat 4s. We are bringing in Cat 4s up to the DoD limits which is four percent. We cannot bring in more than four percent of people that are below Cat 1-3A.

The Secretary of the Army made a decision that instead of trying to gauge that on a percentage per month, he said bring them in until we get to a point that at the end of the year we're not going to exceed four percent, so that's the guidance that we've gotten and that's where we're going.

But let me tell you, this is a very high caliber force that we're bringing in the Army that industry is scrambling for. We're competing with everybody that wants people that can be disciplined, that can think and can act and have character. I'm very proud that we're doing the way we are.

Let me tell you one other thing. In the past the Military Academy and the ROTC graduates, DMGs that we've had, a large percentage of them have left the service after their initial service obligation. West Point is five years and ROTC cadet scholarships, four years. We offered, because we're trying to improve the cultural awareness and other things that we have to do through our officer corps we've offered some increased incentives now for these kids to go to graduate school. So we are raising our graduate school opportunities from about 400, a little over 400 a year that by the year I think 2009 we'll have a little over 1,000, maybe as much as 1100 graduate school opportunities for these kids.

This year's West Point class signed up for this to the tune of 47 percent of this year's graduating class. Extended their active duty commitment from five to eight years for either graduate school,

branch of choice or first unit station of choice. This is very good news for us. What we're talking about now is going back to an idea of a lifetime of service. We're giving the kids an opportunity to get through that period of time when they tend to make an early decision on whether or not they want to stay.

I went through the same thing as a captain. I was getting out of the Army as a captain with seven years of service, going to the FBI because I thought the fun was over for me in the Army. They wanted me to do other things that I didn't want to do. Because I had the opportunity to end up in Special Operations and found something that really suited me, I ended up staying a long time in the Army. It takes a little something, you know, that gets people to make that decision.

This generation we're dealing with here is a generation unlike ours. This is not a generation that signs up for retirement. This is a generation that signs up for opportunity that's before them, and they will change jobs and move to where they see the opportunity. That's like the wind in Wyoming. We've got to learn to ride that wind and we've got to deal with it for what it is.

I've given you more of an answer than you want, but it is complex and I think what you see are some wonderful people that are making choices to serve and they're serving very well, and my view is we've got a very solid Army. But we should not take it for granted.

Q: I wanted to ask you about the fiscal pressures you mentioned earlier. You said if you have to take cuts, make the Army smaller. Now there are some rumblings of \$25 billion in cuts from the Army. How much smaller would the Army have to be if you have to take \$25 billion in cuts?

A: I don't know. We'd have to take a look at it. I'm not just accepting the fact that there will be a \$25 billion cut either.

Q: Are you prepared to live with that if you have to? You can accept \$25 billion in cuts?

A: No. I told you what conditions I think we've got to field the Army in. I'm not going to go back to an Army that has got all these holes in it that you've got to end up shoving everything to the right to go operate.

This is such a dangerous time that we belong to here that we cannot approach it the way we've approached it historically. We don't have the strategic warning and all of the buildup time we used to have. This is a world that you're going to have to play full court press all the time and it's going to get worse and worse and worse, in my view.

When I sit and look and think strategically about the future, I think we're just beginning to see the kinds of challenges that we're going to face in greater and greater ways, and this country has probably never been as vulnerable. Seriously. Where the oceans no longer make the difference that they used to make.

So as part of the defense establishment I have to think that way, and that means I have to have a different readiness model. That's why we've created the Army force generation model that ensures that we've got fully ready units that understand they're in the batter's box and that they're going to be called on very short notice and they must be 100 percent ready to go. I can't go back and in good conscience allow us to back and [ALO] an Army and okay, if we get the big fight we'll give you stuff but you're not going to see it until we have the big fight. That leads us back on this path that we went through that I described in under-investment.

My view is I know what an Army's got to look like, I know what it costs to do it, I'm going to fight and get the support of congress and the administration to do what I think is correct on the thing and make the best case I can for the Army.

Q: General, I'm wondering if you can talk a little bit about the challenges of training the Iraqi police forces right now? And also admits concern that militia death squad members are starting to infiltrate the police forces. How are we [inaudible]?

A: In both Iraq and Afghanistan we're training police and we've got, Major General Joe Peterson's got that job in Iraq.

The police is a little different challenge than the army is because the Iraqi people, I think when you take a look at the traditional respect for security forces the Iraqi Army is the one that people look at.

The police situation really falls in two categories in my view. One of them is traditional policing. The other one is guarding the border and doing that piece of the thing, both of which are huge challenges. Both of which in a society like in Iraq where you have to overcome some of the old tribal family, all of the elements that are involved in the police are huge challenges.

I guess my answer to you would be I don't know all of the, I know the general challenge. The general challenge is the police is a little bit bigger challenge than the army. It might take a little bit longer to get done. But nevertheless, from all reports we're seeing some progress in that regard.

I know there have been all these reports about the militias and some bad elements that are inside the police and all that, and I know they're attempting to deal with it, but that's going to be a tough challenge.

Q: General, to go back to the financial picture, you, Secretary Harvey and others have talked about that to reset the force, to get it ready for the next time, you need two years of supplementals even after the war stops. That's been the idea that's been talked about.

A: At least two years.

Q: Okay, at least two years.

Other people have said, even people, senior leaders in the Army, have said that's going to be a hard sell. That's going to be something you'll have to go to Capital Hill and really sell that. What happens if for whatever reason that doesn't come true, that people don't buy into that? Then what happens to the Army?

A: Then we have a less ready Army.

Q: What's that mean?

A: It means we have an Army with things that are broken, holes that aren't fixed, with equipment that's been used at a--We're using equipment anywhere from three to ten times its use rate over there. It has to be replaced. It's like your family car. You drive it until it breaks. It breaks. If you don't have the money what's it do? Sits in your driveway I guess, unless you want to donate it to the Purple Heart Association. It's just physics. You either get the money to do it or you don't have it so you're not ready. We've seen that before.

We used two years because that's about what it took us to do after Desert Shield/Desert Storm. But this has gone on longer than that. We have a little bit bigger challenge here. But reality is, remember, what we're talking about is that we are continually resetting the Army. We're doing that every day. What we're talking about is those last units that we have there, we have to have that time to reset those last ones that come out and make sure that it's done.

What we're trying to do is do the right thing by the taxpayer, and that is we're not trying to reset ourselves back to where we were, we're trying to reset ourselves forward to an Army that's got the right legs forward.

If I could, because really it answers, it gives you my perspective on a couple of things.

We have a \$13 trillion economy. \$12-point-something trillion. Right? The defense budget right now is about \$440 billion. That's the base. With supplemental, we are spending about 3.9 percent of GDP. That's the lowest percent of GDP that we've ever spent in wartime. I can put a chart up and show you. World War II was 38 percent. We're even spending less of GDP today than we were during the Clinton drawdown years.

The Army's percent of GDP today is .8. Now here's what is amazing to me. I'm not a reader of the Washington Post and I don't mean to insult anybody, but I just don't. But somebody gave me a thing they cut out of the Washington Post in January that was a little chart, you can go back and look at it, that was from the National Retail Association that said that this last Christmas the American people spent an additional six percent over the previous Christmas.

What do you think we spent on plastic Santa Clause and tinsel and all this stuff for Christmas

last year during the holidays? The answer is \$438.5 billion. Roughly the equivalent of the defense budget.

I just don't understand why this is a problem in defending ourselves. I've told Congress this. I've told everybody this. What's the problem?

Q: What did they say?

A: I'll let them speak for themselves. I just asked the question. [Laughter]. Go back and look at this.

I don't get it. We've got a lot to be thankful for in this country and we've got a lot to lose, and one of the first responsibilities of government is to defend the country. The Constitution says that. So I don't understand it. And knowing the physics of the problem as I've described it here and the fact that you are not going to regenerate an Army rapidly, an all volunteer force. This is not the draft any more. This is an all volunteer force. The first time we've had an all volunteer force in a protracted war. You have to deal differently. We'll fight this force differently than we've fought the other force and we have to generate it and sustain it differently.

A: Were you at Carlisle yesterday?

Q: Yes, sir.

A: What did you think about that?

Q: I have lots of thoughts about it.

A: Okay.

Q: I'll send you a note. I was wondering, considering your Title 10 responsibilities, you're often telling us that the window is closing, the window of opportunity is closing. Where do you see the window and how do you compare that to your need to transform how the Army operates in the future? I'm thinking primarily about the officer corps. They're doing different things now and they'll do different things in the future. So where's the window and--

A: I'm principally talking about the fiscal window of opportunity. The United States Army--By the way, just like the Marine Corps, just like the Air Force and the Navy, we have to be learning adaptive organizations. We cannot be static organizations that are rooted in things that don't change. The things that don't change are the principles and the values, but we must be learning and adaptive to be competitive in what we're doing.

So the investment we're making in our soldiers, our non-commissioned officers and officers in terms of training and education, we must arm them to be more adaptive, more self-aware and

adaptive as they go forward, because that's the world we're in. We're in a globalized environment now. We must have the tools to do things because our trade and our profession is rooted in an awful lot.

But when you talk about the status of the Army when we got into this, and I'm talking about I started this whole thing out talking about the fiscal realities. \$100 billion under invested. I told you \$56 billion was in equipment, but what about family housing, what about barracks, what about installations, infrastructure and all this? That's also investment dollars. We are a volunteer force.

You're not going to retain a volunteer force without commensurate quality of life that's there. I'm not talking about living like in McLean. I'm talking about living at a level that's satisfactory and equivalent to the quality of service that our soldiers and their families are giving. I'm talking about motor pools. I'm talking about child care. I'm talking about schools. I'm talking about all of the things that we've got to have to include training ammunition, equipment for the soldiers.

If you take a look at what we've done to equip the individual soldier who's the centerpiece of our Army, it's extraordinary. We've fielded hundreds of pieces of equipment now, body armor and the proper weapons and the proper uniforms and all kinds of things large and small that are important.

So when I talk about the window of opportunity I'm talking about the fiscal resources required to get us, number one, back up on step to overcome the past; and number two, to get ourselves projected forward in a way that is sustainable for the nation and the future at a lower level of resourcing than we have during this period of war.

That's why I see the war as a vehicle for us to get some synergy out of these efforts. Catching up, modernizing, transforming. Using the very same money to do all of those things.

If we were not at war and had to do these things as independent things, it would be far more expensive and probably impossible. That's why I call it a window of opportunity.

So if you put my boots on and looked at it from when I came back in the Army, remember, I had four days notice to come back in the Army. This was not something anybody talked to me about for a long time so I wasn't exactly sitting around strategizing here about what things we were doing. I got a lot of smart people together and I said let's take a look at ourselves and figure out what it is. We came up with focus areas and we said let's explore these areas and use them as a way ahead. We tended to be pretty right because these people were smart and they understood the problem. We focused it and I said okay, here we sit. We've got an opportunity to influence 2004, which we did; we have an opportunity--Remember, we had never had procurement money in a supplemental before. In 2005 I was able to get some procurement. That tasted pretty good to people so they gave us more in the supplemental later that year and the in 2006. If you look at 2007 you'll see a fair amount of procurement involved in that. It spends just as well as base

money, you know. It's expended exactly the same.

So if you look at my windows as we go forward, what I see is each one of those windows is somewhat uncertain. You just asked me about what are you going to do if you're \$25 billion short? Well, we're going to do the same thing, fight just as hard for this next one as we fought for this one, but I see these windows getting smaller and smaller. There's politics involved in it, there's all kinds of other realities, so I am impatient. If you heard my testimonies, I did eight or nine testimonies this year. What did I say? I said if you gave me more money I wouldn't go buy more stuff. I would accelerate what we're doing. I do not want broaden--I want to stay on course and I want to move faster so that we can get through these windows and get ourselves whole faster so that we then can sustain it when we get into an environment that will not [lend] this kind of thing.

I'm sorry to give you such a long answer, but it is really complex.

Q: I want to go back to the generals question that Kittfield asked you. While you've had a decent experience with Rumsfeld, it sounds like. You've had a collegial give and take. There's been an undercurrent in every story about the generals revolt that they represent a latent resentment within the active duty military, that they're speaking for those who don't want to speak out in uniform.

As honestly as you can, is that a fair assessment, that there's a lot of resentment towards this guy that you might have seen coming in through this? That it hasn't diminished?

A: Listen. I can't speak for those guys. I trust that they are fairly representing themselves. It sounds to me like they have some resentment. I'm telling you from my experience--Look, I told you I've been in the Army 37 years. I have worked for some tough people. Twenty-six year ago I went to Iran with Charlie Beckwith. Did you ever know Charlie Beckwith? Charlie Beckwith would make Genghis Kahn look like a Cub Scout, okay? Nobody put us--we're soldiers, we're warriors. We can't get involved in--I've never been intimidated in my life [inaudible]. I've almost been killed by some people that were pretty intimidating, but you know, I just don't see that dimension and I think we've got a responsibility while we're in uniform that if we can't put up with what's going on I think we've got a responsibility to pick our saddle up and move on down to the next range.

Q: I guess I'm asking you, sir, have you heard or do you see the vibes, can you feel them within the military that there's a lot of resentment towards Rumsfeld that these generals maybe articulated? Your experience may be one thing but--

A: I got no questions in Iraq or Afghanistan from anybody on this issue. I had to bring it up. I asked them, what do you think about this? It's not on their mind. I was up at Carlisle yesterday in several different fora. Unless I bring it up it's not on their mind.

Now I don't think it's because people think that I'm going to bite their head off, that's not my reputation. I think they see it as a Washington thing, they see it as something that's outside their shot group, and I think people fundamentally are operating focused on the mission, generally satisfied with the leadership they have that influences them where they are. They're not doing it because Pete Schoemaker's Chief of Staff of the Army. They're doing it because Staff Sergeant Barr is their squad leader. See? You might as well be talking about the man in the moon when you're talking about what's going on up here with Rumsfeld with the soldiers.

Q: Dereliction of Duty is on your master list of [inaudible]. To what extent has that book influenced the Joint Chiefs in terms of being punchy and give and take within the Tank, so to speak? Are you trying to avoid the Dereliction of Duty four years later?

A: The Dereliction of Duty four years--

Q: The book--

A: I know the book. I've read the book. I was CINCSOC when Hugh Shelton was Chairman and we read the book. But the book didn't tell me anything I didn't know. What is it that's so special about the book?

Q: The point being there were five [inaudible] according to him. In your case now are the Chiefs more vocal? More punchy? Whatever word you want to use?

A: I haven't noticed any shrinking lilies in the Chiefs. We all understand that our responsibilities in life is to state our advice. The Chairman's responsibility is to carry that advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. We are responsible to provide independent advice when either asked to or when we feel it's necessary to dissent. I have not seen a reluctance in anybody to do that.

It doesn't mean they agree with our advice all the time. Do you agree with every decision they make at your paper? You can't run around here with your nerves on your sleeves every time somebody in higher authority makes a decision you don't agree with. I think you end up at appoint where look, is it legal, is it moral, is it ethical, can I live with the consequences? If you can't, you've got a responsibility to do something about it but you should do it while you're in the position. My view.

If you've gone through all of that and lived with it, I'm not quite sure what we're doing here cleansing our conscience afterwards? You know what I'm saying? That's why I think it's inappropriate. And I think we've got to be very careful here that we don't get people, I would not want civil authority to distrust the military people that are giving them advice because they were worried about what's going to happen down the road, nor would I want military people to be afraid to give advice because they're concerned about how it's going to be taken.

Q: Do you think that might be happening? There might be blow-back from all of this?

A: I don't see it. But I think if this were to become something out of whack--I don't know what this says right now, quite frankly, but I don't see it influencing what we're doing and I think it's unfortunate. I just think it's--

Q: One more, I didn't get a chance.

You said you haven't always been agreed with. Can you give some examples where your advice hasn't--

A: No. [Laughter]. That's part of the rules. When you give advice the advice stays with where you give it. That's part of the responsibility we have.

Q: That seems like a good place to end it. Thank you very much.

Q: Thank you, sir.

A: Thank you.

END TEXT