

TRANSCRIPT

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THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT AND MAY CONTAIN ERRORS. USERS ARE ADVISED TO CONSULT THEIR OWN TAPES OR NOTES OF THE SESSION IF ABSOLUTE VERIFICATION OF WORDING IS NEEDED.

Q: You've got a massive portfolio, primarily oriented on joint training in your U.S. commander hat. Take a few minutes here and kind of update us a little bit on what you're doing there, especially Noble Resolve, the exercise that's coming up.

A: We do some very interesting stuff down in Suffolk, actually in the modeling and simulation world and in the exercising and experimentation world. It's a mix of efforts to try and look at how we might fight today or engage in natural disasters or the like and how we might do similar things in the future.

One of the things that we've recently done is we've built a model of Norfolk that's a perfect 3-dimensional model that you can put a Category 3 hurricane in, for instance, and you can see where all the waters are going to go, what's going to be underwater, what's not, and we can do that on a pretty real-time basis. So what we're doing right now, and you can also use it to see other catastrophic kind of things. A weapon of mass destruction or the like. So we have a very interesting exercise that we're doing here next month where we're going to have a radiological weapon on a ship that's coming out of Africa some place and it's going to end up going into some ports or heading toward some ports and stuff, so the Port Authority in Norfolk and some of the other areas are going to be involved in this. While we're doing that there's going to be a Category 3 hurricane that's going to come on board and the Commonwealth of Virginia is going to engage all of their emergency response centers and stuff to respond to that. Then we'll go through the whole business of how you respond to a hurricane and the like.

Ultimately we're going to have a similar kind of thing over on the West Coast which will eventually find itself in Portland, Oregon. We'll go through exercising with the City of Portland as well. So it's a very interesting sort of difference on how we're using military technologies and stuff to engage in some of our other responsibilities for homeland defense and response to natural disasters. So it's going to be interesting for everybody involved.

Q: How many forces involved there?

A: Well, it's not a whole lot of forces. Probably all told involvement will be somewhere between 500 and 1,000. It really depends on how many people FEMA shows up with, so FEMA will be involved, the FBI, the Port Authority, the City of Norfolk, the government of Virginia, the City of Portland, Pacific Command, European Command, Northern Command. It really ties a whole bunch of exercises together. But it's really interesting and we'll eventually take this I think to the Governors Conference to show them what technology will allow them to do.

Q: What are you trying to find out? What are you testing in this? Is it equipment or is it command and control?

A: It's command and control, to try and help all of us be able to have more realistic exercises we can respond to so we're prepared for things like Katrina and stuff in advance. In the past we did more tabletop kind of exercises. You'll recall the Governor of Louisiana had gone through or at least her staff had gone through some tabletop exercises. This will put them in a situation that they've got to respond in a timely way and it will test their command and control facilities, their communications and the like.

Q: Will there be Guard forces involved?

A: Guard and Reserve forces. They'll have to respond, so the Virginia Guard will be involved, the Oregon Guard will be involved.

Q: When is this?

A: The first part is April 26th, I think. The 23rd through the 26th.

Q: And if someone wanted to--

A: Contact Denny and come on down. It will occur in Norfolk and Suffolk.

Q: I don't know how appropriate this question will be for you, but given the fact that you're trying to incorporate the Guard and Reserve forces into this, is the UAV question

sorted out yet? We planned to give a lot of those to the Air National Guard and that seems to have stalled out to some degree and then there's also the question of using UAVs in disaster areas. Has that been sorted out?

A: That's interesting. That's a good question because it's going to be used in the Noble Resolve exercise, part of the business is going to be how you can use UAVs in a natural disaster response thing.

I think from an Air Force perspective as to having moved some of the UAVs over into the Guard to fly, I think that's sort of a done deal. It may be moving slower than anticipated, but--

Q: I thought part of the question there though was they originally wanted to base some of those airplanes in the states where they were going to be operating, but as far as I know they're still operating off the ranges or from Nellis.

A: I am so out of touch with what's actually going on in the Air Force.

Q: How about the FAA? They have currently the same question whether you're in Europe or the U.S., getting those things into national airspace.

A: I think that's one of the reasons the Air Force uses pilots as the guys that are actually flying the things so they're able to deal with the FAA and understand the rules.

Q: Just one sort of follow-on to that. The technological disconnect between other NATO forces and the U.S., is that getting better, is it getting worse? Can you tell me the areas where it's getting better, getting worse? And what that means to you when you try to get forces ready to go some place?

A: Absolutely. That is part of my NATO job. I do the training for the Joint Forces before they go into Afghanistan, for instance. And I'm also responsible for defense planning. That's actually about two years out, but it is where we show the gaps we have in the alliance and the capabilities that we need to build within the alliance.

Q: Where are the big gaps that you see that are worrying you?

A: Strategic airlift certainly, as we've changed the level of ambition is what they call it in NATO, to be able to deploy out of the area and respond. So areas of concern are certainly strategic lift, other things like integrated logistics and the ability to sustain the force some distance away. All of those are things that we're working on and that the nations are going to have to work on.

The gaps that still exist that we're working, for instance, are on things like command and control, friendly force trackers, things that take some high level, a reasonable level of technology and investment. As you know, only seven of the 26 nations of NATO contribute the two percent.

Q: Do you have any cause for hope in any of those areas that they're going to get better?

A: I do, mainly because it's driven by war. If you want to transform a force, unfortunately the quickest way to do that is in combat. They see the need, they see the requirement, they're making an investment in the war so certainly they're further along now because of Afghanistan than they would have been without it.

Q: Is anybody's investment going up?

A: Yes.

Q: Or just moving around?

A: Unfortunately, those that are going up are ones that are not necessarily the ones that have the largest GNPs. So--

Q: The impact's not--

A: It's not the same. I thin Bulgaria and Romania, for instance, the new countries, are both striving to reach the two percent. Some of the Baltic countries are as well. Some others are going in the other direction.

Q: And the fact that the C-17 line is getting ready to run out, isn't that worrisome to you personally? If we can't provide the tails, who will?

A: First of all, I think that part of the effort in NATO to buy into the C-17 will help keep that line open for some short period of time.

Q: We're talking about less than a dozen airplanes now.

A: We are. But General Schwartz doesn't seem to be so concerned about that as long as he's able to get what he needs to be able to fill the over-flying that he's been doing with the C-17. And there's a balance out there that has to be kept between what you own in strategic airlift and your ability to still use the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and give them business. So we do a little bit of both.

Q: Do you think there's ever going to be enough pressure resulting from this that the

U.S. government and the Air Force is going to rethink the C-17 buy?

A: I can't tell you. I think everybody wants to keep the line open for some period of time because the C-17 is being flown at a lot higher rate than had been anticipated. So it will wear out early and I think that's been the cause for some additional buys of the C-17.

Q: Good morning, sir. I was curious to know if you could tell me about any of the transfer between your initiatives at JFCOM and your role as NATO Transformation. I know you've worked out some standing joint force headquarters and joint interagency group. Do any of those transfer--

A: Absolutely. It is part of the reason I'm dual-hatted, because my responsibilities are similar, some of my responsibilities are similar. And it begins with the training relationships that we have, so the joint warfighting center in Suffolk, which is very skilled trainers, they will go over and participate and help with the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger, Norway which does similar training for the NATO forces that go into Afghanistan or to the NATO Response Force. Then vice versa. We will use in Suffolk the NATO forces, the NATO trainers to come help us as well.

Technology transfer in things like working interoperability where we're able to take other nations of NATO's, as they're developing command and control system software and the like, we're able to show where we're going and put them all on a bench sometimes and make sure they're compatible and interoperable. The Blue Force Tracker thing that I mentioned which is, you're familiar with Blue Force Tracker. NATO has a very similar problem to what we had in Iraq. You may recall that we showed up in Iraq with seven different Blue Force Trackers that didn't talk to one another. So an Army commander would know where his Army forces were but wouldn't necessarily know where the Marines forces were that were right next to him. And might not have known where a convoy was going through because they had different trackers.

What we did was we took all of those, we at Joint Forces Command, we took those seven Blue Force Trackers, piped them up to a satellite and into a place in Colorado Springs and two seconds later took that common operating picture and pumped it down to the folks in Iraq. So now everybody was able to see everything.

We've got I think 39 different friendly force trackers in Afghanistan. That's the challenge of NATO. You've got 26 sovereign nations that have industries, that don't necessarily have good standards that they have to live by and that's part of our responsibility is to try and develop those standards. But we're working with NATO to do the same thing it did in Iraq, to be able to share a common operating picture.

That kind of stuff is a normal, everyday kind of thing that we do, and it's all because I

wear two hats.

Q: And just as a follow-on, sir, we've been talking in our office anyway and perhaps you can clear this up. NATO used to have the Atlantic Force and we've been considering that with all the concerns of the maritime approaches to the United States coastline, whatever happened to that? What is NATO's role? Is there--

A: That's a great question. I am that person that used to be Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic which eventually became U.S. Atlantic Command and then now is Joint Forces Command. I don't have territorial waters. So that's being done out of SHAPE now, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, through Joint Forces Command Lisbon in Portugal. So Admiral Stufflebeam, I think he's still the commander, has those kinds of responsibilities for the Atlantic for NATO.

Q: So it's a sub-command of SHAPE?

A: It is. It's a sub-command of SHAPE. So all of that combat piece now falls under SHAPE.

Q: The training events that you have planned for fiscal '07, for the remainder of fiscal '07, are they all funded or do you require supplemental dollars to do those?

A: I think I'm pretty well funded in the training arena. They are mostly wartime focused, so we do all the training, for instance, for--I shouldn't even say that. They are mostly funded. But certainly the wartime related ones are fully funded which is the training for Multinational Corps Iraq before they go in, for CJTF-76 which is the Afghan piece; and for Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. Those are all funded.

We also do two major exercises for each combatant commander. Those are funded for the most part. Because we found some efficiencies in the process we were also able to add a second exercise for TRANSCOM, Transportation Command, in '07. So yes, I think from that perspective our funding is okay.

Q: How do you explain the Army saying if they don't get supplemental dollars by April 15 that they can't do their training?

A: Because of the surge and other things, they're talking about actual real, in-the-field kind of training in many cases which requires equipment and the like. And which is different than what I do. I do mostly command centered things which I can do using modeling and simulation, using distributed networks and the like. And it is really designed to do joint staff training. Theirs is considerably more expensive in that it is the National Training Center and the training they do out at Fort Polk, the Joint Readiness

Training Center.

Q: So can you give us a sense of the cost of these new exercises that you have funded [inaudible]?

A: I can to some degree, but we're talking a magnitude of difference. For instance I was just down at Fort Stewart where the 2nd Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division was doing home station training. That's one of the units that's in the surge. They're the last unit to go over. It's one of the units that did not go to the National Training Center out at Fort Irwin. But what happened was the National Training Center came to them and brought their trainers, brought their equipment, so they ran through the whole battle training that they would do the same as if they had done it in the National Training Center, just in a different format. It costs about \$17 million to do that kind of training. It's about a wash. That's about what it would cost to do it at the NTC as well.

The training I do costs nothing like that. If it's a million dollars, that's probably a lot for an exercise that I might do. But this is because it involves moving equipment all across the United States, Humvees, up-armored Humvees, villages that have to be built, hiring Iraqi folks to be part of the villages and that kind of stuff. So it's not cheap to do the kind of stuff that the Army's talking about.

Q: General, following up on the NTC thing, then why have the NTC? We started it 30 years ago because this was a way to replicate the desert environment and train our folks, so it's getting to a [inaudible] a surge going on, we've got to rush these guys back. The NTC really isn't that good. Well is it--

A: I didn't say that. The NTC is really designed, actually it has morphed a bit, but as you know the NTC was really designed to do large force-on-force kind of operations with tanks and artillery and air power and all that. That's the real value of the area.

As we've gotten into counter-insurgency stuff they've built very realistic villages out there to be able to replicate what one might expect to see in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Fort Stewart doesn't have that same kind of capability in the counter-insurgency business, although you're able to replicate it to some degree by building false front houses and stuff like that and bring the Iraqis out. So in a counter-insurgency kind of scenario, you don't necessarily have to have the National Training Center. In fact, I'm sure you know, much of that training is done at the JRTC at Fort Polk. Then in this case they were able to bring the whole NTC folks out to Fort Stewart to try and replicate it as close as they can. And if you talk to General Lynch, who's the 3ID commander, he'd tell you his first choice would always be to go to the NTC. But the training they got in preparation for what their mission is going to be in Iraq, which will be somewhere

outside Baghdad, was very effective in meeting the skill sets they needed to meet. But if he was going to have to go fight in Korea or fight some place else, the training that he would do locally could not be replicated.

Q: My real question has to do with Afghanistan. [Laughter]. You've been talking about getting the tools all ready for the NATO forces to deploy out of NATO or whatever. Is it causing you any heartburn that so many NATO forces are going into Afghanistan with restrictions on them? How does that [inaudible] disability [inaudible] the force?

A: Of course. It's always bothersome when somebody puts caveats on forces, and especially the unknown ones we've had. When you have a force in Kabul and the commander wants to move them some place and he suddenly finds out there are national restrictions that won't let them move outside of Kabul.

Q: He doesn't know that in advance?

A: He doesn't always know that in advance.

Q: How often does that happen?

A: Not a lot, because the Kabul forces are the Kabul forces and they're needed in the capital region. But sometimes you may want an EOD Team, an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team to go out and do something so you ask a particular country to go do it and that's when you find out they've got a restriction on when they're allowed to operate. Then they have to go back, and it's not that they're unwilling, they may have to go back to their legislature or whatever authority they had to go into Kabul in the first place. Yes, that's bothersome.

We've been very successful in getting rid of many of the caveats.

Q: The ones you know about.

A: The ones we know about. [Laughter].

If you listen to Germany, for instance, they've got a large number of forces up in the north and they're working hard to rebuild that part of the country in their Provincial Reconstruction Teams. They would say in an emergency they would be able to come down and assist. That's what Italy says and some of the others that have caveats. The difficulty is in defining what an emergency is. We haven't really had to do that yet.

You can see the problems from their perspective, when they have this huge debate in the Bundestag over sending reconnaissance airplanes into Afghanistan or in the instance of

Italy, I was there about a month before the government fell with the Minister of Defense and he was explaining his problems with the things that he does that the government doesn't necessarily support Afghanistan and some other issues that were related to the American base in Vicenza. And indeed, the government fell about a month after that and the primary reason, they would tell you, is because of Afghanistan. So many of these countries are really at the mercy of their legislatures. You know how Italy is. It's a mixture of right wing and left wing governments and some in the middle--not governments, but parties--and a very small group of left wing folks can cause the government to fall.

Q: How much unimpeded access do your allied members--I heard only 4 of 20 have full freedom to do what you want them to do. Is that right?

A: I would say that's not true. We've got 37 different countries there, and certainly some of the countries like Japan and Korea and some of them that are really there for doing reconstruction and the like don't come with a capability to roam and bring security with them. Those are natural restrictions and that's not why they're there and the like. But certainly the Netherlands and the UK and the U.S. and I think Denmark and Canada, those forces that are down there in the Southern and Regional Command South, I think Estonia is down there too. They've got certainly the freedom to move around that area and Poland I think is also coming in and has stated they'll come in with no caveats.

So I think it's more than four. I can't tell you--

Q: It's not a ratio you're happy with, though.

A: You would always like for everybody to show up and know that if you need them the commander has the option to move his forces where he needs them.

Q: General, can you give us an update on NATO members' ability to develop [inaudible] capabilities that were called for at the Prague Summit, and with the low spending level in the alliance, can you do that?

A: Of course the spending level hinders it to some degree. That's for a number of reasons. Two percent, for instance, is not particularly high. But the other thing that's hampering them is that's the spending that's what everybody agreed to at Prague to close the gap between what happened when the Wall came down in '89 and 1999 when we went into the Balkan War. You remember all those issues--many people couldn't talk to each other on radios because many of the countries involved hadn't invested. So they agreed to do that. In large measure they have closed that gap but it's not--I said that wrong. They are closing that gap. They have not closed the gap, and of course the U.S. and UK and some others haven't stood still and won't stand still while they work to catch

up. So the gap will stay out there.

The impact of spending less than two percent of their gross national product on defense I think has, it's not just that they're not spending that, or some aren't spending that, it's that they're also committed in many other places in the world. Lebanon, Africa, some in Iraq, Kosovo, and those are all expenses that are taken away from their ability to spend money on transformation.

We're going through an issue right now that's a bit bothersome and that's the NATO Response Force that was built as a result of the Prague Summit, was designed not just to be an operational capability but to be a vehicle for transformation as well. There's some concern now that if we lay requirements on the NATO Response Force that are transformational that might cost money, that some nations will not contribute forces to the NATO Response Force because they either don't have the money or don't want to invest in that particular capability. That's bothersome because that really is a pretty elegant way to force transformation through the alliance and I'd hate to see that fall off the table.

Q: What's your assessment about how well or not well the C-17 arrangement is working? Will these multinational purposes expand [inaudible]?

A: I think so. As you know, SALIS, which is the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution, or something, S-A-L-I-S. Through that and some other things they rent, IL-76s and things from the Ukraine, which is how many of them have gotten their forces moved into Afghanistan. The C-17 consortium I think now has, and don't quote me on the numbers, but I think it's about nine members, not necessarily all NATO members. I think Sweden and some other folks are either investing or interested in investing. The way that works is they buy hours. Two thousand hours of strategic airlift time. I think that's workable and I think it will be an interim solution to it.

As you know, there are some concerns on the part of those that build the A-400 and some of the other movement capabilities that feel like they can provide a solution, but the C-17 is really a wonderful airplane. There's nothing else like it out there on the market.

Q: General, you testified [inaudible] that [inaudible] force. [Inaudible] predecessor Atlantic Command is working on trying to get better command and control [inaudible]. How close is the U.S. military to having completely transparent, interoperable command and control? And what are the obstacles?

A: We're closer.

Q: Can you put a figure on it?

A: I can't, because when J.R. Vines was the Commander of Multinational Corps Iraq, he has a wonderful briefing that he has and it shows there were 800 different databases that were being used in his command. All of them designed to track and develop tactics, techniques and procedures and things in the counter-improvised explosive device fight, the CIEDs.

Q: This is U.S. or--

A: I think it's everybody. There are 800 different databases. When he tried to get in and capture that stuff he found that none of those databases talked to each other because bright young folks would go in and develop this database without regard for who else might be interested in it.

We recognize there's not an enforceable data strategy out there to cause people to operate in a domain that everybody can access. We are working on that. We're working very hard on it and we will have a data strategy and data standards that will at least say, sort of like the computer industry did, said look, we can all make money if we all build stuff that's compatible and all use USB connections instead of having proprietary and all different kind of stuff. That's the direction that we've got to go and that's where we're going.

One of the new jobs that, new responsibilities that I have and my staff has is to be the portfolio manager for joint command and control. That now becomes Joint Forces Command's responsibility. The idea is to be able to look across all of the service command and control programs to make sure that we're not spending money on redundant capabilities and also to make sure that an Air Force program can talk to an Army program, can talk to a Navy program, can talk to a Marine program. That's all good stuff.

We're not there yet.

Q: You can't put your foot down and [inaudible].

A: Part of the process is to, and again, we haven't killed any programs yet so we hope this is going to work. Conceptually and philosophically it should work. And it certainly has the backing of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. I was with him yesterday discussing exactly this. He clearly supports being able to have an organization that can say do not buy that program. We're all going to get together and build it like a Joint Strike Fighter where you all agree on the baseline and you build that piece and then you get to the 80 percent level and then you tailor it to your own needs which is the opposite of what we're

doing now. Now we build in stovepipes oftentimes to about 75 or 80 percent and then we decide holy cow, these ought to be able to talk to each other. Then we strap them together. That's what happened to us in Iraq. We arrived in Iraq and you've got 3ID going up towards Baghdad and you've got the Marines going up the other and they've got radio systems and other things that can't talk to each other.

We are moving in the right direction, but we've got legacy systems and that's part of the problem here. Legacy systems are legacy systems and it's very expensive to try and go back and fix those kinds of things.

Q: General, I wonder if you could kind of talk to the deployment of forces in Iraq. As the force provider, how far out do you forecast where you need to be and what you need to provide to the combatant commander? What kind of recommendations are you making to say okay, at Point X we are going to have to do something fundamentally different to do what we're doing. Is it [inaudible]?

A: It is. We look at things in terms of rotations. Mostly in large unit moves. Now ultimately we have to get into the combat support, combat service support business which is often more problematic than the big units, but in terms of big unit moves, we do that in rotations. I don't want to kill you with trying to explain how we log those rotations, but a rotation lasts about two years. Each unit is there for a year. But the first part of that rotation may have been in '06 and the last guys may come back in '08 and we call that the '06-'08 rotation. But we've already laid out the '07-'09 rotation which starts in June, and we have to look at the impact of that for the '08-'10 rotation because that's when you are able to look and see what units will have enough what we call dwell time, Senator Warner [inaudible] that word. It's the reconstitution or reset time. So if you want to give them a year, what units do you put in this great big puzzle.

So we have got all of that stuff pretty much planned out through, well into '08-'09. The problem is you can't account for a surge of five brigade combat teams in that. So when you do that, which is exactly what we did because we've had this whole thing laid out for a while. What you do when you get the five brigade combat team surge, you grab somebody from an early rotation and now you move them in here. Now you've got to figure out a unit to backfill them. So you're just moving pieces of the puzzle around all the time, trying to meet what we call the redlines or the constraints or the desires of the various services to get dwell time, to get training time, to do those things.

Q: I guess what I'm asking is also, will you be able to maintain what you're doing now into '08-'10, whatever it is?

A: With the five extra brigades over there?

Q: Right.

A: It would be very difficult. We can sustain that for a while. I won't tell you how long we plan to surge for, but I can just--

Q: [Inaudible]

A: Because we do worst case planning. That doesn't mean that that's how it's going to happen. So if I told you we'd planned through a date, that doesn't mean that Admiral Fallon has planned to that date or General Petraeus has planned to that date. We live in a "what if" world, and that really gets at your question. We look at the impact of doing this based on a worst case situation from a rotational perspective. And then so that we're prepared if somebody extends a unit or something like that, to be able to pull this unit forward or that unit, so we've already thought through the process.

Q: I just wanted to follow up on that question. Can you talk about what the biggest challenges we will face if the surge is sustained, or asked to be sustained. I'm sure you're working on that right now. What, [inaudible]? What difficulties do you foresee?

A: The challenges are really in trying to allow a unit to have enough time at home to train, reset, and reinvigorate themselves, and then to not have to extend them too long in Iraq beyond their one year boots on the ground. That's how you adjust these things. That's where we have leeway. Although what the Army has done, as you know they've been going through their force modularization and changing the way the units are organized and equipped, and they about a year ago had six brigade combat teams that were off-line and not available to us to be able to be used in these fights, and they have accelerated their equipment, training and everything of all of those so that all 42 brigades will be available in the '07-'08 timeframe which is I think in many cases about a year and a half earlier than they had otherwise been planned.

That is not necessarily a negative impact but it's an impact and those are the kinds of things we're doing to be able to accommodate the needs of the combatant commanders that are out there.

Q: Where do the Guard combat brigades come into this? Both the acceleration of active duty and the Guard brigades, are those still a little bit too far off to meet the immediate needs of sort of [inaudible]?

A: They are. The reserve component is really, we are using a lot of their forces to the tune of I think about six brigade combat teams. And I wouldn't take that number to the bank because it's measured in companies. The reserve component is picking up a lot of the responsibility for the security force which are those folks that are providing security

on the highways and the like, so we talk in terms often of brigade combat team equivalents.

Because of how we went into this war early on, and the policies that we've had up until we just changed recently, within the last number of months, we couldn't get back at the reserve force until five years after they had gone in. I think we caused a problem ourselves by allowing volunteerism early on. So you had all these reserve guys after they didn't get into the 1991 war and they didn't get into Operation Enduring Freedom, now along comes Operation Iraqi Freedom, and by golly they're going to be part of it, and they're great Americans and they lean forward to do it and we said okay. So we had an awful lot of them, so you had units that two-thirds of the unit had volunteered to go to Iraq. Now what you have is a unit where all the leadership has gone to Iraq and you don't have access to them for another five years unless you want to have access to them again. And their employers often have something to say about that.

So we find ourselves without having access to those folks as units, which is what they signed up to do.

So what the Secretary recently did was said okay, we're going to go to unit sourcing so that if you signed up for the Washington, D.C. Guard, you're going to go to war preferably and hopefully with the Washington, D.C. Guard and not with the Baltimore Guard and not with the Richmond Guard. At the same time, he said we can use them for a year. In the past we used them for two years. We can use them before that five years is up. So it has opened the door for us to give us some flexibility in using the reserve component.

The problem is that for a variety of reasons, a lot of it still has to do with volunteerism, to train them and equip them for the counter-insurgency fight and certainly for full spectrum kind of warfighting. It takes a little while. They were not readily available for the surge, but we expect that many of them, other than security forces, will be available to us in late '07, '08.

Q: A quick follow-up. So you have, so the extension of the surge or plus-up, you've got through more extensions and a shrinking of time at home. How far will that go? Are we going to have units doing 18 months in Iraq--

A: As of right now given some of the planning we've done, at least as again, remember, we worst case it, we don't have anybody that we would expect to be there for 18 months. The longest ones that we've extended, and again it's worst case planning, has really been the 1/34th, the Minnesota Guard brigade that we extended for I think 120 days. We also, as you know, extended in Afghanistan the 3/10th.

Q: Good morning, General. I just wanted to talk to you about the surge within the surge where combat support and combat service support has taken 21,500 [inaudible], about 30,000 troops within about ten weeks of the announcement. I wanted to sort of get a sense of how far that additional support element might be and what the timeline is from the time you get a combat requirement to the time you get combat service and combat service support requirement.

A: That's a great question, and I can't answer the standard timeframe until you get that. What happens is you make a request for brigade combat teams. And then you go in and you have to determine where you're going to put them, then you look at your basing structure, your support structure and everything else to determine what additional support you need, and do you have it in theater, can you handle it with what you've got, and then you come back with what we call a request for forces, an RFF, that Central Command would do. They would make that request and send it to the Chairman and the Joint Staff would validate it and say yes, this is a valid requirement, and then they send it to us for us to fill. We go out to our components and go through a pretty significant process to find the forces.

There's no set number on how long it takes. Some of them, if they're going to go to an area that U.S. forces haven't been in the past, you automatically know they'll need some level of combat support or combat service support so you can do that pretty quickly.

What's been going on, which is exactly what's happened, your number's 21,500, 30,000. I can't tell you right now what the number is because it's really hard to differentiate between what General Petraeus wants in his counter-insurgency needs versus what's there specifically for the surge.

For instance the increase in security police for guarding detainees. Some number of that clearly is because of the surge and they expect to have a higher requirement. His strategy might also expect to pick up more detainees and the like. How much of that, I can't remember the number, 1700 or something like that, how much of it is surge related, how much of it is related to something else.

So that number will grow. I think the DepSecretary used a number of about 8,000. That's probably ball park. But that doesn't mean they're not going to come in and ask for [this] capability after they sit and look at all of it. Remember, we only have, only two of the brigades over in Baghdad right now, the third is just arriving and the other two won't arrive for another month and a half, couple of months. So even then they will have to look at it and see if the support structure is sufficient to handle what they've got and make some adjustments up or down.

Q: Do you have any other requests that you're working to fill now that--

A: We do, but we always do.

Q: Beyond the 8,000 that--

A: Again, yes. But they may be related to, one of them for instance is to fill ISAF headquarters slots in Kabul for General McNeil. Those are NATO--they're U.S. forces but they wear a NATO hat. The carrier battle group that went in was a requirement that came down the same way I described with a request for forces. Related to the surge, we've been planning that a long time. The request was in some time ago. So we always are working requests for forces that are beyond the rotational movement of the forces that go out there. Today there's probably five requests for forces that the Secretary will sign this week. It could be five explosive ordnance disposal folks that are going to Bahrain, it could be 30 police that are going to Afghanistan--we're always tweaking, it's part of our fun and challenge.

Q: Still with the rotational thing. Does your planning accommodate the [inaudible] that congressional [inaudible] legislation [inaudible] on there? Specifically thinking about [inaudible] and certification.

A: It has not. We plan our forces and our force rotations and such strictly on the service requirements and the Secretary of Defense's approval process. In other words we do what we need to do, or we plan to do what we need to do to be able to support the combatant commander and then we take that requirement and we put it into the chart and we go to General Campbell, for instance, at Army Forces Command in Fort McPherson and say we need a unit of this type.

Q: [Inaudible] the law says you can't deploy a unit until it's had 12 months dwell time. What does that mean?

A: It will have a significant impact.

Q: Will you be able to meet those requests for forces under those guidelines?

A: Without--I'm answering this for Senator Warner based on the hearings that we had on Thursday. Without taking some absolutely significant risk in other places it would be very very difficult.

Q: What does that mean?

A: Well, it means are we willing to pull a brigade out of Korea to go do that and meet those timelines? Do we want to send reserve component forces over in ways that don't

best meet their needs and stuff. We just have to make some adjustments and I can't tell you what those adjustments would be. But if you took the no-dwell break which makes no sense, by the way. From my perspective. If seven months is workable for the Marines, why would you say that the Army has to be on the ground for a year?

Q: Because the Army goes for 18 months and the Marines go for seven.

A: They don't go for 18 months, but yes, they go for a year, and the like. But the fact is you can physically do it and we have done it. So it's a matter of policy and the like. But that's a commander's call. The commander has to be able to assess his ability to perform the mission that he's being asked to do. That's why we give him the commander's bonus, which there isn't one. [Laughter].

Q: How are you going to, or what are the prospects for filling the request for forces in Afghanistan for trainers? They've got 1277 now. They've asked for 3300, which is a rather large--

A: I can't give you the answer to that because we're working it right now.

Q: How big a challenge is it?

A: It's a big challenge, and one of the things we're discussing right now is the offering of a brigade.

Q: Rather than individual--

A: Rather than individual augmentees. As you know in the individual augmentee, the real problem that the Army and the Marines have with this is it's not the numbers as much as it is the type of people they call. So you take out senior enlisted leadership and officer leadership in a brigade or a battalion. So that's the problem, because you need that quality of experience and seniority to be able to go mentor the forces. That's what they're doing. So how do you take a brigade that has a whole lot of people that are low in rank and experience and fill that same need? We're exploring that to see if there's a way to be able to do that and ease the pain.

I think General Schoomaker says that it costs him 10, 15 brigades of leadership or something to fill those needs. To fill the transition teams in both Afghanistan and Iraq. You can't see that out there because when you go to a brigade as they're going through their training process and stuff and their leaders are there and the like, but it is a tax that the Army and Marines are having to pay.

Q: On the NATO Response Force capabilities, what transformational capabilities are you

after that you're getting push-back from?

A: Again, it's not specific push-back we're getting, it's the concept. Again, this is just something we're debating right now. It's the concept of raising the bar on the capabilities of the forces. In other words, a great example since we were talking about Blue Force Tracker and Friendly Force Tracker, it would seem logical to me that at some point in time SACEUR would say I want everybody in the NATO Response Force to come with Friendly Force Tracker. That makes sense to me. It makes sense that SACEUR would say I want everybody that is going to be part of NATO Response Force 10 to come fully capable of operating in an improvised explosive device environment, trained and ready to operate. So that's where the debate is. We agree that we need to do that. The push-back that's coming, or at least the concern that's coming is when you do that does country so and so say okay, I'm not going to invest in Friendly Force Tracker right now. I'm not going to do that until this time or that time, so therefore, I'm not going to contribute forces to NRF-11. We're already having problems, as you know. NRF-8 has not been filled.

Q: General, I wanted to, this is maybe a little bit off your portfolio, but I was wondering as a senior NATO commander if you can talk about there seems to be greater strains with Russia in the alliance and Russia to the United States. Right now [inaudible] over missile defense.

How serious of a development is that? And Russian threats to withdraw from the IMF, how seriously do you take that?

A: That is outside my portfolio. I'll give you my impression. I was in Munich when President Putin stood up and did everything but beat his shoe on the podium. It was a surprise. I had dinner the night before in Seville with Defense Minister Ivanov who is now the Deputy Prime Minister, or Deputy President, whatever he is to make him be able to compete for Putin's job. Our conversation was very open and very agreeable and the future looked good. Obvious concerns about Georgia; obvious concerns about the spreading of NATO into the Ukraine and Georgia, right on the borders of Russia, why are you doing it kind of stuff. But a useful conversation that was amongst people that were discussing issues and why this concern. And so when President Putin stood up and said what he said, all of us were somewhat taken aback. Is this real? So I think it's caused us all to sit back and take a look and see if the relationship is really what we thought it was in the direction it's going.

As you know, we have, and I sit in these meetings, we have a NATO-Russian Council at whatever level we're going to operate at. Usually at the Defense Minister or the Chief of defense level. Those are good forums to be able to discuss issues. If you sat in one of those, especially with Ivanov, you would feel like there's headway and we're working

together on all these things.

Granted AGS, sorry, the missile defense has created some angst on the part of the Russians. I don't understand why because they could destroy it easily. It's not designed to handle the kind of threat that Russia would--it's just not that kind of system. It is really designed for ballistic missile kinds of things in not overwhelming numbers and Russia has overwhelming numbers of these things. If you look at the location, they could knock them out with conventional weapons and stuff. They don't need long range kind of things.

That's all been explained. This has all been transparent. All discussed with Russia. So their great concern is one that I'm not sure where it's coming from. Certainly what it's caused, I think you've seen recently Germany has said we need to go discuss this from a NATO perspective rather than bilaterally between Poland and the U.S. and the Czech Republic and the U.S., so we'll see where that goes.

There is, as we go back and look at it, many folks think maybe what Putin was doing was doing this for consumption back at home. It was just a strange place to do it, for one thing. And why would you need to do that when you've got an election coming up and stuff. I don't know.

Q: Do you see the need for [inaudible], more extensions as the surge continues, [inaudible]?

A: Completely dependent on how long the surge goes. Again, in a worst case planning situation, yes, there would be a requirement for more. If it were going to last past the summer I think we'd at least have to look at some extensions.

Q: We're over time. We'll have to leave it there. Thanks very much.

A: Thank you.

END TEXT