

TRANSCRIPT

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THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT AND MAY CONTAIN ERRORS. USERS ARE ADVISED TO CONSULT THEIR OWN TAPES OR NOTES OF THE SESSION IF ABSOLUTE VERIFICATION OF WORDING IS NEEDED.

Q: We have Lieutenant General David A. Deptula. You all know him. He's the Deputy Chief of Staff for ISR, A2 they call it. Glad to have you. First time through. I can hardly believe that, but the first time through this group. Welcome. As we were discussing coming down here, probably the best way to do this to start out is to simply note that you've got a big reorganization of ISR going on over at the Air Force. Give us an update, what you've accomplished so far, what is yet to be achieved, where you're going with it.

A: I'd be happy to.

I think most of you are aware that until last year the Air Force has never had a Deputy Chief of Staff position for Intelligence at the three star level. As a matter of fact, never had a Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. It was an Assistant Chief of Staff, the two star level. Last year General Moseley established the position in the February timeframe. I showed up in July. Immediately after that he hosted an Intelligence Summit at Headquarters Air Force where we brought some former members who had run intelligence for the Air Force, some gray beards who have been in the business in a variety of different capacities, and some of other key Deputy Chief of Staffs. We sat down and we talked about where we've been, where we are, what his vision is, and where we want to go in the future.

During that session, during that summit, I asked him, I said, Chief would you give me 90 days or so to take a look at and assess where we are and come back to you with a way ahead? He said yeah, sure.

I came back to him in November with a series of recommendations that he ultimately approved and that we've put into place. Let me give you a little bit of background in how I kind of parse the challenge.

After talking with a variety of different organizations inside the Air Force, going out and talking to my sister service brethren with respect to organization, how did they organize to conduct the function of intelligence for their individual services, and meeting with some of the gray beards out there with intelligence expertise. It's of interest, one of the individuals I met with was a gentleman by the name of Admiral McConnell. This is before he was designated to be DNI. So that was very fortuitous. We brought all these inputs together and thought that the best way to look at some of the major muscle moves with respect to what we need to do in the Air Force was dividing things up into three areas.

The first area was the whole notion of what are ISR capabilities and how should we plan and work to establish the best way to move forward in each one of those capabilities areas?

The second piece was organization. As you move into anything, are we optimally organized to execute the intelligence function?

The third piece was the personnel piece. Some of you may or may not know the Air Force has not fared well in terms of senior level positions in the combatant commands or senior positions in the joint/national community for about the past five or six years. As a matter of fact we have not had a flag officer in any combatant command position in the last six years, and that's just not good for the joint community.

We set up a couple of working groups to explore courses of action in each one of these areas, and then took their briefs, consolidated all this other information, looked at some of my sister service models, and came up with some recommendations for the Chief.

I went back in in November, he approved them, and we just completed last Friday the major organizational piece course of action in redesignating Air Force Intelligence Agency as the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency, and moving its reporting line out from underneath Air Combat Command as a direct report to the Air Force A2. We did that for a variety of reasons. One, and this kind of will establish the rationale for why we made the changes we did in the organizational area, and then I'll touch a bit on the personnel area and the ISR capability area.

But organizationally, when you look at the way the Air Force had been organized, the organizational structure had been put together before we had a Director of National

Intelligence, before we had an Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and before we had a Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. So we ended up with a structure where you had some centers, like the National Air and Space Intelligence Center reporting to Air Intelligence Agency who was then reporting to one of ten major commands in the Air Force, Air Combat Command. Looking at that, we kind of asked the question why do we have that kind of convoluted chain when in fact we ought to be able to streamline the organizational process and also identify intelligence as an Air Force-wide enterprise, not just one that is working for, granted, sort of the parent MAJCOM, major command, of the combatant air forces. But let's streamline the reporting function, let's make folks aware inside the Air Force that this is an Air Force-wide enterprise, and then on top of that what I wanted to do is expand the function of AIA from beyond signals intelligence, which I think most of you are aware was its principal focus, to becoming a multi-INT organization.

So that was one of the major organizational pieces external to Headquarters Air Force. Internal to the Air Staff we had a lot of different ISR functions spread out amongst all the different directorates. What I wanted to do and asked the Chief to consider is to consolidate and establish a focal point for ISR inside the Air Staff.

So I went to him and said what would you think about changing the title of the DCS from Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence to Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance. He said yeah, that makes good sense. So we've done that. So I'm now the focal point for ISR on the Air Staff and essentially, in the past you had a variety of different organizations throughout the Air Force at one point or another speaking for ISR for the Air Force. Now you have one focal point.

You also have the folks in the major commands inside the Air Force now have an advocate for ISR on the Air Staff. So that was part of one of the other major organizational changes with respect to ISR capabilities.

You all can interrupt me here because my eggs are going to get cold. [Laughter].

ISR capabilities. It struck me, and this isn't unique to ISR, but you all have been around the building and understand that the way we manage things in the building is through program elements. But if you take a program element focus, that's exactly what happens. You focus on the things and tend to exclude the overall capability that the thing was designed to provide.

So I asked some of my folks in some of these working areas, I said let's come up with a way that we can -- We're not going to supersede program elements as the basic building block of how work's done in the building, however I can put in place a different approach to the way we manage program elements in the ISR arena, and that's what I'm

doing. This is kind of something new. I'm establishing, first we're defining a series of ISR capability areas, then I'm going to designate what I call an ISR capability area integrator to monitor what's going on in that particular capability area to assure that in this set of program elements that make up that capability, the left hand knows what the right hand's doing so we don't have disconnects as we move forward in trying to deliver a particular capability.

That's notional. I do have some examples. But before I go into that level of detail let me hit my other area, and that's personnel.

I mentioned up front that we don't have a lot of representation in the senior flag officer, general officer levels in the national and joint locations, and that's not something you can change overnight but it is something that the Chief is every interested in doing, and he's committed to basically building a bench of Air Force general officers with intelligence as their specialty, and we are putting together career paths to ensure that, we make sure that as people move along in their career they get the breadth and depth of experience necessary to make them competitive for some of these positions as we move forward.

So those were kind of the three areas that I started off with to craft new direction for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance inside the Air Force, and what I call my major muscle moves. We've been able to basically put those three in place.

Now I've got a whole series of other what I call long term ISR transformation areas, and I'll just give you kind of the --

Q: Do you want to have a couple of bites of this first?

A: Sure.

Q: Let Otto ask a long question.

Q: The Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps have been using their targeting pods [inaudible]. How does that figure into what you're doing? Are you going to institutionalize that? It seems to be now kind of an in-theater thing to help the guys on the ground. Are you looking at ways to make that non-traditional ISR part of the overall ISR picture?

A: Wonderful question. Thank you very much.

It is a great question because it's a great lead-in to what I was about to say in terms of I've got a bunch of long term sort of what I call ISR transformational issues that I'm interested in too. One of them is the whole notion of what people are today calling non-

traditional ISR. If we move into the future ten years and look backwards, I'd like to turn what we're terming today non-traditional ISR into traditional ISR.

Look, we've spent the last 100 years in the Air Force trying to figure out how to target a particular target anywhere on the face of the earth, all weather, day or night, and do it in a rapid fashion. We can do that now. Now the question becomes all right, what is it you want to target? What is it you want to have an affect on? Do you want it to be kinetic or do you want it to be non-kinetic?

Which then raises the whole notion of okay, if we can do all of that stuff what's the appropriate balance? Or should we take a look at and relook the balance between sensors and shooters? Do we have sufficient number of shooters vice number of sensors we have out there?

Part of the solution is to take some of these systems that are under development and capabilities that we already have like pods. You bring up pods that were designed to do targeting that we can now use to acquire information and capitalize on those systems to enhance and build up our capability to do the sensing function.

So I believe that yes, you're going to see the normalization, if you will of what have been targeting pods into the IS system to then be another sensor to add to the cumulative set of data that we have to move forward and identify items of interest.

That moves into the whole realm of some of the new aircraft that we're acquiring. Some of you have heard me say this before. You hear about F-22, you hear about F-35. I believe this is an area where nomenclature has been a hindrance to us because I would tell you that the F-22 and F-35, they're not F's. It's not an F-22. The F-22 is an FBEARCEAWACS-22. It is a flying sensor platform. It can do all of those things, not just shoot down a bad guy airplane. As a matter of fact it's a magnificent sensor because of its stealth and speed and integrated avionics capability. It can operate inside adversary battlespace from the first moments of any conflict. And maybe what we want it to be doing there is collecting information.

So capitalizing on the capabilities of some of the modern systems that we are acquiring will allow us to increase that effective ratio between sensors and shooters and that's something that I'm very much interested in moving forward in because it is a different mindset. We also need to be able to schedule systems like that for the purposes of ISR and then to be able to process the information. So those are some of the things that we're thinking about in regards to what has traditionally been called non-traditional ISR.

Q: Tell us what the status within the Air Force and I guess within the broader ISR

community is of space radar. What mission you see that performing, has it absorbed what was to have been the E-10, low altitude, mid altitude? What's the idea, and is it something the committee is getting too big to create?

A: The committee?

Q: The community, so many cooks that you don't get anything valuable out the other end. I mixed my metaphors.

A: Again, it's a great question for a variety of reasons. I'm very interested in space radar and making sure that the Air Force ISR community is engaged with the development of the concept of operations for how that system will and can be used. Before I get off on some of the pieces that I think are important, you ought to be aware of that. But the direct answer to your question is no, I don't think the committee of interest, if you will, has gotten too large because the system is still in the concept development phase with respect to how we're actually going to use it. And no one has shut anybody off in terms of their interest. And space radar is going to be unique because it will have the capability and the capacity to deliver product to both the operational community and the intelligence community because of the superb resolution that it will provide and the enormous area that it can surveil and the rapid revisit times because of the nature of the system and the AESA radar and where it's located.

There's no definitive answer yet because the concept of operations for how this will be used is currently being designed. I have representatives who participate in that concept development, ConOps design -- National Reconnaissance Office does, the Air Force Space command does, there's representation from the national intelligence communities. So I think we're at the phase where we're wrestling with just how can we optimize this magnificent capability. So nothing definitive yet, but nobody's certainly been excluded.

Q: How about in terms of the mission of the E-10 or the Joint Stars? Has this now superseded that requirement?

A: No, it doesn't. It basically supplements. We have to be very careful. To be extremely basic, military planners wouldn't want to put, you don't want to put all your eggs in one basket. We don't want to transition to an all space-based ISR capacity. Conversely, there's lots of great things you can do from space that you can't do from air. But with respect to multi-cueing, that's something we would very much like to do -- use space sensors to cue airborne sensors and vice versa. Just by nature of the physics, the space-based system of course, depending on the number of balls that you have, will establish the revisit times. But that might be an area that you want to establish constant stare over, that you can't do with space-based systems, that you can do with a close-up look of

an airborne system, so there's the issue of cross-cueing.

Again, the direct answer to your question is no. I don't believe space radar will offset the necessity for airborne systems like JSTARS or an E-10 like system at some time in the future, but will in fact be able to be incorporated with the proper kind of concept of operations that we can achieve the synergy between both a space and airborne system.

Q: On the [inaudible] executive agency, I wanted to get an update [inaudible] and the other services, what's going on --

A: I'm shocked. [Laughter].

Q: -- with the Army, Navy and Marine Corps on that. Also, Congress, especially the House, seems to be supportive of the [inaudible], to study the issue. So an update on that as well on your communications with the Hill.

A: Thanks. It's obviously a very topical area and I'm pleased to relay that I believe that now that folks understand to a better detail perhaps than when General Moseley first sent out his memo to the DepSecDef, they're beginning to understand what the EA proposal is all about. Let me not put words in anybody's mouth, but we're moving forward on the issue.

First let me explain very briefly what the issue entails. The proposal for establishing an executive agent for UAS basically revolves around two pieces. One, achieving effectiveness in the acquisition of five major systems. MQ-1 Predator, ERMP, Warrior, MQ-9 Global Hawk, and Vance. Those are the five systems that we're suggesting that you can achieve acquisition effectiveness and increased efficiency through combined acquisition. Not every UAS system as some have reported.

The second part of the EA proposal has to do with achieving standardization amongst all UAS operating above the transition altitude in theater, and it varies depending upon what theater you're talking about in Iraq today it's 3,000 feet . The idea here is, doesn't it make sense as we move to the future to assure standardization of identification systems, for example, at the birthing of these systems as opposed to trying to kluge identification systems afterwards? Then there's also the piece of sharing information, that ultimately we'd like to move forward with respect to an EA, and we think an executive agent would facilitate.

But again, the notion here is not to control requirements, not to control acquisition or design or utility of all UAS systems. Again, achieve standardizations. If you're going to operate in this airspace above 3,000 feet you need to be visible to the control organization which is the Joint Force Air Component Commander. We're operating in

two areas where we have the luxury of unchallenged airspace, but that's not always going to be the case. So we need to know, Joint Force Air Component Commander on behalf of the Joint Force Commander needs to understand and know who's out there. So that's where the standardization piece comes in.

That's what EA is all focused on.

With respect to the update, the Vice Chairman, Admiral Giambastiani, requested of the Deputy Secretary that hey, let's take a look at working this issue on the EA proposal out in the JROC. Mr. England agreed. We've had three JROC meetings to date on the subject and the issues moving forward. I don't want to get into specifics. Admiral G's the owner of the JROC so you'd have to ask him the specifics of what's going on. I don't really want to talk about that right now because dialogue is moving forward.

Q: When do you expect a decision to be made?

A: Again, I'm really not the guy to ask on that. You'd have to ask Admiral Giambastiani. But I think it will be sooner rather than later.

Q: General, as a follow-up, where would you sit within this UAV/EA [air environment] and how would you direct your penetrators to look at these [inaudible]?

A: Again, it's an acquisition function. There would be a, I can get you the proposed layout, but we would have folks who would be representatives. But again, it's an acquisition function. The Senior Acquisition Executive would be the Secretary of the Air Force, then there would be a Program Executive Office. I would not directly be in the EA organization

Q: But your integrators, how would you --

A: That's different. Again, depending upon, and we're right now in the process of defining all right, what are these, how do we want to establish ISR capability areas and then what program elements make up each one of these ISR capability areas? It could very well be that one of the program elements for MQ-1 would be one of those blocks, but that has nothing to do with the EA function.

For example, let's look at -- Let me pass on that one. It gets too technical to get into the details here. But I would not be involved in the executive agency structure.

Q: A different topic. The Air Force has talked periodically about their concerns of technologies for fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft capabilities proliferating to countries that perhaps we wouldn't like them to proliferate to.

I wonder if you can talk at all, obviously in an unclass basis, what your top concerns are in terms of what technologies are going where. Specifically if you can talk at all about China. Obviously the Israelis and the UAV technology is a concern there, going that direction. I know French and Russian technologies, particularly in the fighter aircraft and radars and what not, there's been concern in that regard.

Can you talk a bit about where your top concerns are as you look at potential air adversaries and fighters and anti-aircraft?

A: Quite frankly I'd prefer not to get into specifics because there then becomes a blur between what is classified and what's not. Suffice it to say that proliferation of advanced technologies around the world is a challenge that we have to deal with and it's becoming more of a challenge, not less of a challenge in this kind of interconnected world that we have.

General Jumper is very fond of saying, if you recall, that you put one of our pilots in one of their airplanes, they'll beat our pilots in our legacy aircraft every time. That certainly is a concern and why it's important to move forward with next generation aircraft.

Q: Is there anything you can say about China. [Inaudible] pretty silent on air power. We talk a lot about naval and I guess missile capabilities.

A: All you have to do is look at the Chinese in terms of what they're doing in producing their own indigenous fighter aircraft now and coming up with the SU-30MKK and increasing their fleets of fighter aircraft, and what they're putting on them in terms of land attack and sea attack, cruise missiles. They are achieving a power projection capability that in the past we weren't too concerned about. But it is becoming more and more of a concern with respect to capability. The question is, okay, why are you -- every nation has the inherent right to build systems and military capabilities for self defense, but when you get into the arena of building offensive power projection capability, what are you doing that for? What are your intentions? Which gets back into the intelligence piece.

Q: The [Indian] air force, I think there's been a lot of talk about. I don't know if surprised is the right word, but certainly the respect for which a lot of the U.S. Air Force has for their ability to jump from basically a Third World air force to something approaching [inaudible] air force. Can you talk a bit about that and how that might relate to China in terms of their capabilities? Train their pilots, more of their pilots to be more world class kind of guys?

A: I went over to India twice last year. And as you're aware of, we've had a couple of

deployments over there. They are a very competent air force. Part of that's a combination of not just equipment, but also the training. The Indian air force has a very robust training regime and their pilots fly at a rate that they can achieve superb proficiency.

We have to recognize that again, now that the systems and the capabilities are resident, you get a nation like India or China who has a mature air force. They're going to capitalize on those systems and develop capabilities that quite frankly match what we used to think we had an advantage with.

Q: What steps has the Air Force and CENTAF taken to support the [inaudible] ground troops over in Iraq in terms of Predator orbits, increasing [inaudible], [inaudible] missions?

A: The Air Force has increased capacity both in terms of JSTARS crews, U-2s, Predators. By the way on Predator, tomorrow Predator will achieve a milestone, Air Force Predator, in terms of going over the 250,000 hours flow mark which hours are one of those things that I argue is difficult grasp. Okay, what does that mean? What that means is that's a lot of hours. [Laughter]. The Air Force has gone from one orbit in 2001 to 12 orbits, Predator orbits, that we're flying to day in theater, and I think as you know are planning on moving up to 21 orbits which was the QDR validated requirement.

The numbers of missions that we fly with Predator most recently have increased are on the order of 80 missions a week, 1500 hours a week, 200 to 250 targets prosecuted per week.

Q: Can you give a benchmark?

A: Tony, I would have to get you the specifics. It is an increase. Off the top of my head I don't have the specifics, but I can get you the data.

The other big piece, I think the number is 1600 plus in terms of Rover units, distributed Rover, for those of you who aren't really into it, is basically a remotely operated video screen where data that the Predators and other UAVs are picking up can be displayed directly to surface forces with that equipment. It is pretty slick. And we have moved forward, really. When you look at acquisition times for systems we've moved forward very quickly to provide a capability where soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are operating on the ground.

Q: [Inaudible] Rovers?

A: Rover is a piece of equipment, so we're generating those and we're getting them out

to folks as quickly as possible. Some of our allies are picking up on the systems as well. But just to give you all an idea of how these different pieces work, I'm reminded really quickly, this will just take a second, but in western Iraq there was an example of a Marine unit who was pinned down by a sniper. The Marine Forward Air Controller happened to have a Rover piece of equipment with him, Predators overhead giving them a view of where the sniper is. The Predator now is being controlled by a pilot 7,000 miles away in Nevada. Is beaming this picture to the Forward Air Controller who gets in contact with a Navy F/A-18 in the vicinity who he now talks onto the target and destroys the sniper. I can't think of a better example of joint warfare in action by that one that's enabled by these two pieces of technology.

Q: Are you getting any examples from the last couple of weeks or months in terms of Baghdad and [inaudible], how these things are helping real time [inaudible]?

A: There's no significant -- yeah, there are significant changes in the context of the distribution of the Rover system. The concept hasn't changed, but the distribution of capacity and capability has.

Q: In the summer you surge your ISR assets --

A: That's correct.

Q: What about repositioning [inaudible] Hellfires during the last couple of months?

A: Again, I don't have the specifics off the top of my head. We've fired on the order of 250 Hellfires over the last several years. But don't forget, that's off the Pred. But remember the example I just gave you, okay, that Pred didn't have Hellfire, but it was significant in terms of being able to guide another air asset onto the target. So I don't know what you're getting to in terms of the release of actual lethal ordnance off the platform, but it operates as part of a system.

Q: Does the 250 for the CIA's --

A: Nice try, Tony. I'm not going to go there.

Q: [Inaudible] the 250 --

A: That's Air Force.

Q: That's just Air Force.

Q: -- Iraq?

A: No, it's across the theater. That's Predator. Predator system. Air Force Predator system.

Q: The CIA is not part of the 250 --

A: Nope.

Q: You mentioned the U-2. More than a year ago the Air Force tried to cancel it and Congress prevented it. I'm wondering what the status is with that with regard to Global Hawk and how far Global Hawk is from being able to take it over?

A: We have a plan. We've laid in a schedule such that we will not divest or make any major divestiture decisions with respect to U-2 until we have demonstrated that Global Hawk can pick up with an equivalent capability/capacity. We do have timelines that are laid out. Again, I can get you that whole transition plan. We're talking a complete phase-out in transition to Global Hawk in the vicinity of the '12 timeframe.

Q: A couple of weeks ago these guys up in New York, Google Earth. What kind of -- this is a capability that used to be resident in nation states only and now it's available to anybody with the internet. What do you think? What's the danger there?

A: Talk about dangerous, if I may, it's really irrelevant because it's there. No one is going to undo commercial satellite imagery. I can remember back during QDR 2001 talking about the notion that anybody with access to the internet and a credit card can get a picture of anywhere on the face of the earth. That's what Google Earth has done, so it's certainly something that we need to be very aware of, because you can do that.

Just as a little aside, on my last assignment, I have some good friends in Australia. I don't know what his intent was, but this guy sends me a picture of my house at Hickam. [Laughter]. Immediately I knew about the timeline too, because there was a certain kind of car that was parked in the driveway that I didn't have any more.

So if the implication of your question is this information is now available to anybody who's got it, there are -- it is huge and you are right. It's something that was a closely guarded secret not that long ago and now everybody's got access to it.

Q: How do you mitigate it?

A: Well, good question. There are lots of things you can do with respect to it, and by the way, other nation states are doing as well in terms of camouflaging, concealment and deception, because we do all have to be aware of that.

It also drives home the importance of and the growing dependence on and the fragility of space-based architecture which is what we have to be concerned with. We kind of got a wakeup call earlier this year with the Chinese ASAT test.

Q: Are you arranging for any blackouts of places?

A: Again, I don't want to speak to specifics, but not that I'm aware of.

Q: You can see Area 51, by the way. [Laughter]. I haven't checked it out yet.

A: I've got to tell you, just as an aside. Last night I was at home and my son who is 19 years old and getting into his second year at the University of Alabama, he says okay, if they ask you if aliens really exist, what are you going to tell them? I said I'm going to tell them that yes, they do, and one of them is my son. [Laughter].

Q: General, you've long been recognized as one of the more eloquent advocates of air power. I'd like to ask you two quick things on that.

Number one, to your mind has the use of air power by the U.S. and its allies been optimized in the Iraq war?

A: The short answer is yes. Second, let me just capitalize a bit on your introduction there, and thank you for the kind words. But I'm really a strong advocate for the whole notion of how, a strong notion of the advocacy for the American way of war which is capitalizing on each one of the capabilities that each one of the services provides.

The whole notion of coming together under the command of the Joint Force Commander to pick and choose what are the most appropriate force elements to meet a particular contingency at a particular time. And yes, I believe that air has a huge value in contribution, but it's certainly not the only value, and sometimes you're going to have different force elements who are going to predominate one way or another.

But yeah, air has been optimized. What is frustrating sometimes to some of us is that it has become so ubiquitous and so routine, we make it look easy when in fact it's not. There are a lot of things going on that just don't get the headlines, and that's fine. No one's complaining about it.

Example, the use of GPS. It has become an apparent God-given right and it's a utility now, that's how it's viewed. It's used by a variety of all our sister services, not just for the application of precision weapons, but for location information, for navigation information and all the satellites are flown by Air Force personnel.

The lift piece of the equation. You all know that, I would hope, but every 90 seconds an Air Force aircraft lifts off from some place on the earth and delivers significant equipment to somewhere in the theater, and that airplane, the C-17 can be rapidly turned around and transfigured into a critical care unit, and now move our injured personnel rapidly back to better care facilities in the States or elsewhere. All that tends to be -- not to mention the fact that strike assets are on call all the time over Iraq and Afghanistan. So yeah, I think we're being optimized.

Q: Speaking of strike assets, how much of a challenge would it be to cripple Iranian nuclear facilities from the air?

A: That's an interesting hypothetical question.

Q: No, it's not hypothetical.

A: Well the context of --

Q: Is it doable?

A: Sure.

Q: Details. [Laughter].

A: I'm not going to go down that road. We have the ability to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic effects anywhere on the face of the earth rapidly. The issue then becomes one of policy with respect to where is it do you want to affect and when. That's something outside, that's well above my pay grade.

Q: But ISR dictates whether or not you're going to hit the right stuff.

A: It depends on your definition of right stuff. But yeah, we have the capacity to surveil and to determine where we want to deliver an affect, whether it's kinetic or non-kinetic. The issue is much larger than the capacity. We do have the capability.

Q: I wanted to ask about career progression for intel officers. I wonder if you can detail more of what you're looking at in moving them up through the career paths. And also, how this emphasis on intel, where it's at in the last couple of years. A lot of Air Force 2nd lieutenants, lieutenants and captains [inaudible] cutbacks.

A: Let me answer the last one first. The career shaping has not just occurred with intelligence officers. It's occurred across the board. The goal has been to come down in

manpower.

With respect to the career path development. Back when I was talking about the organizational piece, one of the things I did in my office in the Air Staff in establishing it was set up a force development directorate. So I have a whole directorate now whose function is to identify and monitor appropriate career paths so we assure both our enlisted and officers in the ISR field get the appropriate level of experience that will make them attractive for joint and national positions. I'll be happy to get you some specific examples. There's a variety of different career paths depending upon who and what you're talking about and what particular specialties we would grow those things in.

One of the things that we have done recently, again, as part of this re-exploration of how we want to move forward in the personnel arena, is it used to be an intel officer would go to his or her training at Goodfellow Air Force Base, get the basic training, and then move on out into squadron, wing and beyond, and that was it. We have instituted sort of a mid-career training and education course where we can get those folks back and get them back up to speed in a formal sense before we then move them on, and there are a variety of initiatives in that regard. That again, I'd be happy to share with you if you're really interested in the details. I just don't have them off the top of my head. Quite frankly, because there are so many different paths. Different career paths that I could bring you in and sit you down and show you.

Q: I wanted to [inaudible] executive agency [inaudible] hearing yesterday on the House Armed Services Committee regarding roles and missions. A member of Congress suggested this is a really very [inaudible], and I wonder how you see it. [Inaudible] such a big change because UAVs are going to be so important to the future of warfighting.

A: Again, were you here when I was talking about the EA earlier? There's a third piece. The two pieces that I spoke about in terms of achieving acquisition effectiveness and standardization are issues that will directly come under the purview of the executive agent. The third piece is the operational employment piece which I think you're alluding to, which is not the purview of the executive agent, but he is the joint force commander, and how he or she wants to orchestrate their forces.

Here there is a difference of opinion and perspective between the Air Force and the Army that basically boils down to this. There are units, divisions want to make sure they have access to information, and one of the ways they want to acquire this information is by ownership of theater capable assets. ERMP. Warrior.

The Air Force's view is that the joint organizational structure that we have, the American way of war that I've talked about, is the best way to optimize capability provided by theater capable UAVs to folks who are operating on the ground. Here's how.

If this table is the theater, if you have a theater capable asset and you only assign it to a unit that's going to operate the size of that square plate up there, you're sub-optimizing the capability for the rest of the theater. It's as simple as that.

So the issue, quite frankly, is not one between the Air Force and the army, it's one between those units that are sub-elements of the joint force commander's area and how the joint force commander wants to or could use those assets across the entire theater.

The analogy I like to use is that of take a 50 block city and a mayor. In the city the mayor has access to five fire trucks. The way the Army wants to do it is assign one of those fire trucks to each block. You've only got five blocks of coverage. What we're suggesting, the joint approach, is you let the mayor determine where to put the fire trucks based on the need across that 50 block city. Plain and simple, that's what the difference of opinion is.

You have a limited number of assets. What's the best way to use them? Every one I know, and what the Air Force position is is the same, ultimately the effect is the same as what our friends and compatriots in the Army want and that is to get the information to the people on the ground who need it in an optimal fashion. It's just that we believe there are two different approaches in accomplishing that objective.

Does that help?

Q: It does. I think the question, though, is a little bit broader than that in terms of, broader than the Air Force/Army fight in terms that a larger issue the Congress is grappling with on how UAVs are going to be used in the future.

A: Which then gets to, that's the purpose of why we're proposing the executive agent. What happened is, you have, after 9/11 and after we moved into Afghanistan and Iraq people discovered the utility of these systems. We had a proliferation of systems which is, that's fine. That's what happens. But now we're getting so many of them and you have limited numbers of resources. It just makes sense to put an organization in charge for DoD, for medium and high altitude systems which are the ones that have theater capability and that cost a lot more than the small ones, so that we can optimize based on each of the individual service requirements. The services would retain their own requirements. They'd retain their own money. So we can solidify and to the degree possible and what makes the most sense institute standardization at the beginning of the acquisition process, not after systems have proliferated out into the field. That's one of the reasons we want to do this. There's been too much county option.

Q: A follow-on, how is [inaudible] dilemma, the disagreement you just described about the mayor of the city. How is it any different intellectually from the argument over

centralized control of airborne assets that's been going on between air deals and ground pounders since [inaudible]?

A: It's not.

Q: So it's the same damn thing.

A: Yeah.

Q: Okay.

Q: That's it?

A: It's true. You put your finger on it. That's exactly right. And we saw what happened in Kasserine Pass and it didn't work out very well, and we don't want that to occur again.

And by the way, let me add, just to try to put an explanation point on some of these comments. There are no Air Force targets in Iraq or Afghanistan. They're all targets under the purview of the joint force commander. I'm continually amazed and it disturbs me a great deal that there are folks in the Pentagon, on the Hill, in the press, that don't understand that the services do not fight. The components do, but they all fight at the behest of the joint force commander, and I think that works very very well. We cannot afford to move away from the direction we were headed toward with respect to the Goldwater/Nichols initiatives. We just simply cannot afford to do that in the future. As a matter of fact we need to achieve greater interservice interdependence than we have in the past.

The joint structure allows us to form and operate and it all boils down to trust, quite frankly. But we can't afford duplication any more because the money ain't going to be there. You all have seen the charts in terms of social spending and Medicare and Medicaid. That's going to increase at, maybe exponential is not the right term, but really fast here in the next five to ten years with us baby boomer folks retiring. So I think we're seeing the apex of defense spending. It ain't going to grow, it's going to go down from here. It's non-discretionary. All that other stuff is non-discretionary. So we've got to become more interdependent if we're going to achieve greater effectiveness.

Q: The 22 that's an F, A, R, C, everything. My impression as an outsider that's watched these institutions for a while is that to the people in the front end of that aircraft, the fact that it's an F and not an A or an R is really important.

A: I'm sorry --

Q: Wait -- That's the impression one gets. And on the other side of it, up until 20 years ago there were several decades of dedicated tactical reconnaissance units in the Air Force. Pilots spent their careers driving [RF-84s] and 11's and [inaudible]. My hunch is that there were tactics and procedures that you learned as you sneak around, that you didn't learn if your job was to kill bad guys' airplanes.

A: That's true.

Q: This is obviously beyond why [inaudible], but the fact of life of these new generation of vehicles, the [inaudible] that are all purpose [inaudible], are people thinking through what that means for what kind of mindset you are looking for when you take in personnel and how you train them?

A: That's a magnificent question. I really mean that in all sincerity. It goes kind of back to one of the items on my "to do" list in terms of future ISR transformational areas is just that, to change that mindset. Let me put it this way, to expand the mindset.

Quite frankly, I'm a case in point. I've got 2,934.5 hours of F-15 time.

Q: Not that you're counting. [Laughter].

A: My career aspiration is to get 3,000 and then I can retire. [Laughter].

My perspective has certainly changed from when I was a lieutenant flying F-15s at Holloman and Kadena and Eglund, to where it is today. I'm still an F-15 driver. I can still do that, by the way. I'm still sitting on an [active format] but in terms of capacity, of what not an F-15 can do but some of these modern aircraft, which truly are -- I hesitate to use this word because it's been so over-used. But they really are transformational because they can do so much more. It's not just the next generation fighter. They are flying sensor platforms. But you are right, we have to change the mindset and it's one of the things I want to do is change the mindset in terms of how do we extract the capability that's resident in these platforms? Because it is different than the way the old Air Force used to approach the different aircraft and the capabilities that we had, and quite frankly that was tribal in nature. We're trying to move away from that.

Q: General Hayden in a speech earlier this week talked about the difference between the Cold War and today is the idea that before the enemy was very easy to find, hard to finish; and now the enemy is easy to finish but hard to find. I wondered how that changes what you do and your priorities looking forward knowing that it's probably going to be like this for some time.

A: Again, it's a great observation. It goes back to what I said in the beginning in terms of

we spent a long time figuring out how to finish. We can do that now. Now we've got to be able to find. What that then portends is perhaps a rebalancing, an investment between sensors and shooters. But the way we're going to do that is not necessarily through buying more stuff rather than capitalizing on the staff we have to extract the kind of information that will allow us to modify the effect of those capabilities, which goes back into my whole point on being able to integrate these next generation fighter systems into the ISR collection, process, analysis and dissemination system. Which by the way I haven't had the opportunity to talk about yet, but that's something else that Tony, going back to one of your comments or questions, what have you done to increase the capacity of ISR systems with respect to the Southwest Asia AOR. Our distributed common ground system, which is a God-awful acronym. DCGS. They're really ISR exploitation centers. If you say that, that means something.

I can't tell you, but until recently if someone said DCGS to me I'd go huh? But this is where we process and collect information that has been distributed from or comes out of U-2, Global Hawk, Predator, and now we want to expand this whole system to be able to process information for all the INTs -- the SIGINT piece -- to incorporate them.

But there are five principle centers. There's one in Korea, one in Hawaii, one in California, one in Virginia, one in Germany. But we process this information well away from an adversary. So we're outside of harm's way. But then can deliver the information rapidly back to anybody who's on the ground that needs the information. That's huge. That's where we want to continue to go. To be able to project power without projecting vulnerability, which kind of goes back to that's what airspace and cyberspace capability allows you to do.

Q: Without large formations and without bases to look at in terms of the enemy, is it very very difficult and frustrating to deal with an enemy that looks like everyone else and --

A: Sure it is. It complicates the problem enormously. If you want to hide, you can hide. So that also brings into the fact that there are a series of multi-INT capabilities that we need to use. You can't just rely on one. Not just the technical piece. It brings into the equation the importance of human intelligence, the interfaces. And by the way, there is a recognition inside of our military the importance of cultural awareness and languages and so on and so forth, but the best way to capitalize on people who know the environment is to acquire the services of the people who are there as opposed to training someone and putting them in. That's all part of the equation. It does become very challenging. It also portends a move toward combining multiple intelligence sources to derive information that you couldn't get from just one. That's also what we're doing from the air piece by the way, too. Taking signals intelligence, combining it with imagery intelligence, combining it with measures and signatures intelligence, combining it with

HUMINT to define a particular product.

Q: Given that the F-22 and F-35 are going to be the intelligence and signals vacuum cleaners, what does that do to the requirement? Is that such a great tool that you want to have more of them than are currently on the books?

A: Yes.

Q: Reducing the amount applied to the fighter mission, or --

A: No, again you've got a multiple -- what's on the books now still doesn't meet the defined requirement -- 381. Which, by the way, I would suggest to you is a minimum requirement. Thank you for the question, but this allows me to go to the heart of what defines our force structure. Quite frankly, an enduring element of our national security strategy is that we will be present forward. The driver of force structure is not the individual fight or scenario, it is this enduring element of our national security strategy that requires us to be forward, which makes a lot of good sense in order to prevent conflict in the beginning, and if necessary and you have to fight, well, you're already familiar, you're already there.

So in order to do that, in order to meet that element of national security structure, strategy, you need to have an adequate rotational base. I would tell you that rotational base demands are such that, quite frankly that's what does drive the 381 requirement -- 24 unit equipped combat capable aircraft per air expeditionary force unit.

Q: -- for combat purpose and --

A: No, it wasn't set for a combat purpose. It was set for the combination of combat and meeting the national security strategy which was to have an adequate rotational base to be able to operate forward without driving the force into the dirt. We learned that lesson in the 90s when we had to provide forces on a constant basis in Northern Watch and Southern Watch, and that's why we went to the AEF rotational base structure. We learned that from our friends in the Navy, and I think we learned that very well.

Q: So this concept was planned from the beginning of using them as ISR vacuums?

A: No, no. That's a separate and distinct part that is additive to the requirement. At the very beginning you said do you need more than what's currently on the books, which my answer was yes. What's currently on the books doesn't meet the actual requirement as defined by the rotational base requirement, which you've got to incorporate into that all right, how are you going to use these platforms? How are you going to capitalize on these platforms for the ISR piece?

So yeah, we could use more, but we're going to use them in the same way we're going to capitalize on the question earlier with respect to pods. You have that capability. Now how do we capitalize on it in terms of scheduling, processing and dissemination?

Q: That's what I'm getting at. Doesn't that then become a tension between the people who want to use them for clearing the skies and you guys who want to --

A: No, I'm one of those guys for all of that. Don't get me wrong. But you're correct, there is a tension --

Q: -- may not be in the place where you want to collect the information.

A: That's right, and that's what we need to work through. There's not an answer yet. That's work that needs to be done and that's one of the areas that I'm interested in pushing, to make sure that we do work in that direction.

Q: We're out of time.

A: Thank you all very much. It's been very stimulating for me.

Q: Thanks for coming.

END TEXT