

TRANSCRIPT

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Commander, Army Forces Command
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Q: Welcome to General Charles Campbell. He's the Commander of Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson. The first time before this group. I believe the last time we had a FORSCOM Commander here, his last name was Powell, and his first name was General. That was a long time ago.

A: Indeed, it was.

Q: We're glad to have you here.

A: It's great to be here.

Q: You wanted to say a few words about your job, so why don't you go ahead and do that.

A: Let me just take a couple of minutes and describe to you what Forces Command is. As hard as it is for me to believe there are people in the community who are sometimes befuddled by the organization. It is an Army command, and in fact it is the largest Army command. And as the FORSCOM Commander I'm in relationship with the Chief of Staff of the Army as the commander of one of his three Army commands. And essentially FORSCOM has all operational conventional forces that are stationed in the United States aligned forces command. So that's our three corps--1st Corps out at Fort Lewis; 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg; and III Corps at Fort Hood; and in seven divisions stretching from Fort Drum in New York down to 3rd Infantry Division in Stewart; 1st Cavalry Division at Hood; and the 82nd at Bragg; and the 1st Infantry Division at Riley and so forth. So that's about 255,000 soldiers that are in the active component.

I'm also, interestingly enough, an Army service component commander, Joint Forces

Command. In that capacity I have other responsibilities. In fact training and readiness oversight is a responsibility that derives from the Secretary of Defense, is passed through the combatant commander, in this case Joint Forces Command, to their service components. So FORSCOM is an Army service component of Joint Forces Command, and in that capacity I exercise training and readiness oversight for all conventional forces that are CONUS based--active, Reserve and Guard.

In that capacity I also exercise my responsibilities as the Army force provider. So in coordination with Joint Forces Command which is the joint force provider, I provide Army capabilities in support of combatant command requirements.

Interestingly enough, FORSCOM is also the executive agent for mobilization. In that capacity that I exercise principally through 1st Army, I'm responsible for the mobilization, post mobilization training, deployment, redeployment and demobilization of all reserve components that are brought on to Title 10 status.

What does FORSCOM do associated with those responsibilities? FORSCOM oversees the modernization, the manning, the organizing, the equipping, the training, the deployment, the mobilization, the redeployment, the resetting and the transforming of conventional forces that are aligned to the United States.

Does that make sense to y'all? That's what I do.

Q: Small job.

A: And that's what, fortunately, everyone that works for me does and we think we do it pretty well.

Q: I forgot to mention that you're an LSU Tiger....

A: Go Tigers. [Laughter]. That's spelled G-E-A-U-X. [Laughter].

Q: We were talking on the way up about, you've got a heavy Guard and Reserve component in your command, more than half of the forces that you command. A big transformation from being a strategic reserve to an operational reserve. I mentioned that don't you have a problem because you don't have enough captains to do that? You said in the grand scheme of things that's pretty minor. Why don't you tell us in the grand scheme of things the problems you face in making that transformation.

A: First of all, I'm in relationship with the Guard and Reserve. You may recall that in years past the Army Reserve, the USARC was a major subordinate command of FORSCOM. They were aligned to the Department about a year and a half ago as a direct reporting unit.

My relationship really associates to the authorities that derive through the joint line and

that is training and readiness oversight. And then particularly, as those formations are mobilized then they move from in the Guard case a Title 32 status to a Title 10 status in which case they are attached to Forces Command. So it's a complex relationship, but it is not a command relationship. As you might imagine, there are some sensitivities about relationships as it relates particularly to the Guard. And justifiably so, I might add.

Some of you may not know the historical trends associated with the relationship between the standing Army and the citizen soldier formations that have historically augmented the standing Army during crises and conflict. The historical trend is, every time we have a conflict, either during the conflict or in the aftermath of the conflict, our nation revisits the relationship between the standing Army and the citizen soldier, community-based formations that augment it. So there is invariably a discussion about the size of the standing Army and then its relationship with our citizen soldier formations that reside in the Guard and in the Reserve.

That discourse occurred associated to the Korean War and produced the 1952 Armed Forces Act which did many things, but prominently among the things it did, it established the reserve component as a strategic reserve. So for 50 years the paradigm has been that we would mobilize the Reserve and the Guard in response to a major combat operation. It would be employed sequentially, that is after the employment of the active component, after an extended period of mobilization, post-mobilization training, and it would be deployed for the period of the conflict plus six months. Those are the descriptors of the reserve component as a strategic reserve.

That does not comport with how we have used the Reserve and the National Guard over the last seven years. Most assuredly not since 9/11. So we've used the Reserve and the Guard in ways that suggest an operational commitment vice a strategic commitment, but we've never revisited the paradigm. We've simply adapted the paradigm over the course of the last six and a half to seven years. And the suggestion that we need to operationalize the reserve component is the suggestion that given the foreseeable future as we understand it to be, as we believe it is likely to be, where we're going to be involved in confronting elements of a variety of characterizations and we're going to be in a condition of persistent conflict and we're going to have to be reliant on our Reserve and our Guard and they're going to be repetitively deployed and repetitively mobilized, we need to change the paradigm. Changing the paradigm is going to require a good deal of public [inaudible].

So it's less a matter of how many captains are in the ranks than it is about the public discourse that's going to have to evolve, because ultimately it is going to be national decision how we choose to employ our reserve components and associated thereto, how we intend to resource them because for many years we've resourced them, that is we equipped them, we've modernized them, we've trained them, and we've resourced them in ways that reflect our intent to utilize them as a strategic reserve and not as an operational force that's fully integrated with the active Army.

Any follow-on questions to that?

Q: You talked about the relationships. I presume you're talking about primarily with the governors and states. Are they on board with this? Have you been in discussions with that part of the leadership and is this something that, I'm sort of groping with where to go here with it, but are you of the same mind on where you're going here?

A: I don't know that we would ever be able to build consensus across 50 governors.

Q: Fifty-four I think.

A: Well, it's 50 governors and four territories, yeah. Fifty-four.

Q: What feedback do you get on that question? Do they come to you and say we need better resourcing? What kind of consensus is there among the governors?

A: Generally, in my view, it resonates pretty powerfully because associated with operationalizing the reserve component is the presumption that you're going to infuse resources in the reserve component that give you the kinds of capabilities and the levels of readiness that are required to be able to predictively access the reserve component and use it in a way that creates synergy with how the active component is being employed.

So from the governors' perspective, they want to see increased levels of readiness. And they want to see increased capabilities to respond to the state mission. And to a large degree, because of how we have adapted the paradigm, though we've mitigated this, there's been some erosion of capabilities within those formations of the National Guard that are not aligned to a requirement to be federalized. So it's in their interest I think, one, because they'll get more resources; two, they'll have more capable forces that they can leverage in the execution of their Title 32 state missions.

Q: But they wanted that back in the old strategic reserve days.

A: They did, indeed.

Q: So what has changed? Do they understand that with the additional resources comes perhaps a loss of control over those forces?

A: There has been a historical theme that as the federal government has infused more resources into the citizen soldier formation, whatever that might have been, the militia at one point, the Guard, that there is a commensurate expectation of greater access and utilization. I think that's a fair expectation.

The fact of the matter is our standing Army is not sufficiently large to meet the demands for land force capabilities that exist today and are likely to exist in the future. So to meet

that demand we are going to have to continue to be reliant on our reserve component. That's a reality. It's a reality that's been true now for seven years and it's likely to be true for another generation.

Q: What would be large enough?

A: I think that's a matter for the public discourse as well. Here's the fundamental problem, and this is the problem that defines my day every day, and it is that we exist in an environment where demand for land force capability exceeds sustainable supply. So then the proposition becomes how do you expand supply? One way you can expand supply is by growing the active component. We're doing that. So as you probably know, at one point we were authorized an end strength at something on the order of about 480,000. We've gone now to about 520,000. And it's envisioned that we will grow to 547,000. With that growth, which is, and those are active component numbers. That's about 65,000 or so in the active component. Most of that growth currently is programmed to occur in the operational forces. That's about 50,000. All of that will be absorbed within Forces Command and that centerpiece six additional Brigade Combat Teams. But as you might imagine, there's some complexity associated with growing the Army and there have been discussions about how rapidly that growth should occur. There's a lot of interest in accelerating that growth, and that is indeed the department's plan.

But that then takes your available inventory of Brigade Combat Teams, which is the coin of the realm, from 42 in the active component to 48.

Q: Your claim that for the next generation we'll have to rely to some degree on the Guard and Reserve because of the demand for land forces. Is that okay? That for that long, sustained period of time there will be a constant demand in these reserve forces?

A: I think that's the operative assumption. If you make that assumption and there is prevailing wisdom that we're going to be involved in an era of persistent conflict, then you can extrapolate from that assumption the necessity to have military capabilities that are adequate to that environment. And so your options are a couple. You can expand the active component, and what number would that be if you wanted to preserve the reserve component as a strategic reserve? It would probably be on the order of 800,000. Because if you look at what we have de facto in the active force now, that is the active Army plus that which has been mobilized from the Guard and Reserve, plus a big number that's veiled, and that is the AGR full time support embedded in the reserve component, that number probably aggregates to something close to 800,000.

Now is an 800,000 man active Army one, recruitable and sustainable? And two, is it affordable?

Q: Gordy Sullivan thinks so.

A: I'm not suggesting that a large Army is not desirable, but I think there is a reality associated with whether or not you can recruit and sustain that large an Army given today's demographics. Then there is the issue of affordability.

So it would seem to me that there may not be the political will to grow an active component to that size. Considerations of whether or not it's doable notwithstanding.

You can reinstate the draft, but I don't believe anybody is of a mind that that would be a desirable thing to do. If you don't reinstate the draft, you don't grow the Army to 800,000, what are your alternatives? Your alternative is to create predictable access to properly readied formations in the Guard and Reserve. Therein lies the thrust of operationalizing the reserve, changing the paradigm.

Q: Let me just come back once more, because my question was not very precise. How do you assure that access when you're dealing with independent political figures such as governors, TAGs, et cetera?

A: That is a different question and that's a useful discussion to have. There are risks associated with making that kind of investment in an operationalized reserve component if you cannot have assured predictable access to those capabilities. And right now the Director of the Army National guard doesn't have a lot of directive authorities over National Guard formations in an Article 32. His leverage generally grows out of the fact that he controls the resources, and in controlling the resources he can encourage and suggest and recommend and influence.

Q: How about moral suasion?

A: Moral ascendancy is the word. But there is an issue associated with authorities relative to Guard formations in a state status.

Q: Do you see the need for change of say legislation that would give you more confidence you, the FORSCOM Commander, more confidence that you would have that access when you really needed it? You wouldn't have to be quarreling, wrangling, with independent political figures to get that access.

A: I think before the nation can responsibly make that much investment there's got to be some assurance that they have predictable access. Now what are the mechanics associated with that access? That remains to be seen. But the investment would be significant. It's completely reasonable that were the nation to make that investment there is the corresponding expectation that they could leverage that investment by accessing those capabilities. And we would desirably access those capabilities consistent with our Army Force Generation Model.

Q: You're right, that is a bigger problem than the number of captains. [Laughter]. Lisa Burgess, you're up next.

Q: Can you talk about how the Army's new field manual that elevates stability to the same level of importance to warfighting, how does that affect you? It seems like it would have an enormous impact on what you do.

A: I applaud the publication of 3.0. We've been in this fray in Iraq now for five years and Afghanistan for seven years, and it had been a number of years since we had updated our cornerstone manual. If you look at what is driving change in recent years, what has driven change is ongoing operations in the theater. So we have become very adept at altering tactics, techniques and procedures based on lessons learned as a function of ongoing operations, principally in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Then what's driven change is the Army's desire to transform, that is accept the conditions for establishing an Army that will meet the threats we envision in the second half of the 21st Century. But those have not been wedded until we produced a doctrine, because historically what's driven the Army has been our doctrine. So I applaud the fact that we've produced what I think is a very thoughtful document that will provide us the framework that allows us to move forward, and the recognition that stability is a key component of the nature of our operations is simply a recognition of what we've been doing now in Afghanistan and Iraq and quite frankly, many other places throughout the world for the better part of a decade now.

We have largely adapted to, and I think in a very agile way, to ongoing operations. I would encourage you, if you get an opportunity to visit our National Training Center out at Fort Irwin, or our JRTC at Fort Polk, you would be quite impressed with the rhythm of adaptation. A lesson that's learned in the theater, it's validated and in very short order you will see some manifestation of that lesson learned in the scenarios that unfold at an NTC and a JRTC--

Q: Can you give us an example?

A: Yeah. I can give you an example. This one comes immediately to mind.

You may recall several, and time has a way of coming together for me, it's been more than several months but it hasn't been more than several years when we first confronted the use of the chlorine canisters. Within a fortnight we were posting that tactical dilemma to soldiers at the JRTC. As soon as there is a new innovation associated with Improvised Explosive Device and we've validated the improvisation, it is represented into a scenario at the JRTC. So there's a link of relationship that connects the JRTC, the NTC, our Battle Command Training program, and 1st Army which is the headquarters that's subordinate to FORSCOM that is responsible for executing the post-mobilization training of all reserve components. They're very very contemporary with the conditions that we confront in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Q: I was speaking about 3.0 with one of its authors and he said this is going to continue

to bring massive change in how people are trained because you're going to need to cross-train people in different disciplines. How does that affect you from a planning perspective as someone who's responsible for training and preparing people for the field?

A: I guess when we went into Afghanistan and Iraq we went into kind of an institutional notion that if you could perform combat operations at the high end, that is at the general war, major combat operations end, everything else was subsumed in those kinds of capabilities. We learned this in fairly short order. There was no great epiphany that occurred. In fairly short order we realized there was a body of expertise, a body of knowledge, a body of understanding that had to be mastered in order to operate in a counter-insurgency environment and therein lies the thrust of the need to embed into your training effort not only the ability to conduct operations, operations and defensive operations, but this ability to conduct stability operations.

Because we are so hard-pressed to meet our requirements for ready forces in support of combatant commanders, our focus has largely been on COIN, counter-insurgency. And where we have taken some risk here of late is, quite frankly, in our ability to prosecute operations at the high end. This is a matter that has the interest of a lot of senior leaders and has my interest. But in part it's a matter of the arithmetic. As long as you're in a 12 month dwell, 12 or 15 month BOG scenario, in that 12 month dwell you really don't have adequate time to reset the force and then train the force for both high end and counter-insurgency.

So given the requirement we have put the emphasis on counter-insurgency but we fully recognize the need to reemphasize our ability to fight at the high end. I think we will address this much more meaningfully as we're able to extend dwell. So when you get into a scenario where you have rather than 12 month dwell, rather 18, 19 or 20 month dwell, then you're going to be able to train to the high end for a period of time and then when appropriate, transition to focusing on whatever directed mission you may have associated with meeting a requirement for a combatant commander, wherever that might be. Does that make sense to you?

Q: But when you're able to extend the dwell you'll go back to training people first at the high end as a priority and then drop back to COIN or whatever is necessary?

A: They're not that discreet. Even today if you were to go out to NTC you would find in some rotations some high end training taking place. The notion and the doctrine suggests that for a conflict in the future you're going to be conducting some combination of offensive, defensive and stability operations. Those proportions may vary so that it's predominantly stability, some offensive and less defensive, for example, or at the high end it would be predominantly offensive, some defensive and then some stability. But whatever we're doing out there, we're really talking about the proportion of stability to offense and defense, and right now at our training centers the proportion, the majority is being focused on stability operations.

Did that make sense to you?

Q: Uh huh. General, speaking of dwell, FORSCOM developed plans that would move from the current 15 month towards, back down to 12. Can you talk to us a little bit, General Casey has suggested that even with the pause, that they would still be able to shorten the tours. Can you talk about how optimistic are you that the Army will be able to go back to 12 month tours? And as you look ahead, can you talk about the strains on your forces and how much that is needed? I guess the other thing to address is can it be done by August 1st as has been suggested?

A: Arithmetically it can be done by August 1st. That is absent the desires of the combatant command. So we can begin in August deploying formations generally, I mean there are always some exceptions to the rule, but generally with the 12 month BOG and then followed by some period of dwell that would be equal to or greater than 12 months, but that's arithmetic and that doesn't factor in the desires of the combatant commander.

The combatant commander over there, for all the right kinds of reasons, is going to try to create flexibility and it's not beyond the pale that by reserving the ability to selectively retain brigades for longer periods of dwell in order to have that flexibility, that might not occur. I expect what might occur is there will be a discussion in the next month or so and that will be informed by the views of the Multinational Corps Iraq Commander, now General Austin, General Patraeus, the senior uniformed and civilian leadership and from that discussion will be a determination of how we might want to proceed and that will be communicated to me and then I will do the mechanics associated with translating that into trained and ready formations to meet combatant requirements in whatsoever fashion they may be defined as a result of this discourse.

I will tell you that 15 months is a lot longer than three months added to 12. [Laughter]. There was no great epiphany there either. When went to 15 month BOG we understood that 15 months was a lot longer than 12 months plus three. And as we have done our sensings with the returning formations that are returning after 15 month dwell, that expectation has been validated. So it is from the service's perspective, and this is General Casey's view, it's pretty important that we return to a 12 month BOG, and I may have mixed those terms there but I was speaking about BOG, at the earliest opportunity, recognizing that we need to return to that in ways that comport with the requirements of the combatant commander.

Q: How long can you go at this 15 month pace? When do you hit sort of that breaking point that you've talked about, the difficult to mass the forces, to get all the training and equipping and everything done. How soon ahead do you see for the breaking point where it's really going to be--

A: It's a matter of policy now. It's a matter of SecDef policy. If you've been deployed on a 15 month BOG, then you will have 12 month dwell, and then it's a matter of at least

department policy that if you've been deployed once on a 15 month BOG and you've returned to a 12 month dwell, you will not be deployed on a subsequent 15 month BOG.

I think the 15 month BOG discussion relates to this tranche that we have deployed with the full expectation that they were going to be deployed for 15 months. That being an intention with the natural desire to return to a 12 month BOG at the earliest opportunity. But I don't think anyone believes that 15 month BOGs are sustainable. We don't know what is, quite frankly, we don't know what is sustainable. What we do know is that we've met the requirement to date, and what we do know is that the soldiers that stand in the ranks today are the best trained, best equipped, most skilled soldiers we've ever put into a fray. And what we do know, that at least today is that we're able to recruit to the number that's required and we're able to retain to the number that's required. But then we move into the realm of speculation. What constitutes a sustained level of commitment that you can sustain with the high quality force that we've been able to put into the field for the last number of years?

The wisdom is what we generally need to do is move to at least a 1:2 for the active component, and desirably to a 1:3. That's the general wisdom. And the general wisdom as it relates to the reserve component, we need to move to a 1:4, desirable 1:5. That is one year of six desirably, but certainly one year of five. Those are terms that sometimes are described as objective ARFORGEN, but they're really just descriptors of BOG/Dwell rations.

My belief is that we probably need to at some point move to a 1:2 for the active component, and to the degree that we're able to extend it over time, to a 1:3.

Q: I wanted to follow up on the conversation about the National Guard and Reserve. One of the arguments on the Hill right now is to get the Guard control of their money to buy equipment and assets. Is that one of the things that you decided to hold off on? Do you have an idea of getting [inaudible] you need?

A: I'm not sure exactly. Right now I believe that all that equipment is being funded by federal sources. Again, it's a matter of, at a corporate level, and I would imagine that will probably remain the case.

Let me talk about the Guard, because we've just recently deployed, are in the process of deploying five Brigade Combat Teams. It was a huge mobilization. This was lost on a lot of people. But this fiscal year the mob load for 1st Army is projected to be around 69,000. And unknown to many people, embedded within that number is more than 16,000 sailors and airmen that are being trained by 1st Army to perform in lieu of function. But in the last several months we have mobilized five brigades of the National Guard and we've mobilized them in places like Bliss, Hood, Bragg, Stewart, Camp Adelberry. And it's a remarkable testimony to all those that had a partnership in that mobilization, and that included the Guard Bureau, it included the state joint task forces, it included the mobilizing units, it included 1st Army, FORSCOM, it's hugely complex to

mobilize a Guard formation under any circumstances, but it is made all the more complex when they're mobilizing to perform a mission for which they're not organized. That was commonly the case as we mobilized Guard formations to perform functions as convoy security companies force protection companies, [inaudible] operations companies. So it reflects a great agility on the part of the formations themselves, but it also speaks to the power of a pretty powerful partnership between all of those stakeholders.

Q: Would it make it easier for the Guard to get the equipment that they need when they want it if they have control over it? It would make your job easier in the sense that you aren't having to worry about when they were getting the money for their equipment.

A: That is one element, and I was asked several months ago to lead an initiative called the Army Initiative 4 which was this initiative associated with operationalizing the reserve component. And one of the things we suggested as a task that had to be accomplished was we had to develop a coherent equipping strategy for the Guard and the Reserve.

At one end of the continuum is give them their full complement of MTO&E equipment, and equip it to a standard MTO&E. That is, MTO&E that would be equipped, active and Guard alike. I think most of us would agree that that's the desirable outcome. The problem is it's very expensive to do that and we've never equipped the Guard anywhere near that fashion in the past.

Where you'd evolve to in a resource constraint is the Guard has do have the equipment it needs to execute its Title 32 missions. Some of that is dual use equipment, but they've got to have that equipment. They have to have a complement of equipment to be determined that allows them to train to their core mission task, that is the core tasks that have to be accomplished by that organization. Is that every piece of equipment? Some would argue that it's not every piece of equipment, and some would argue that it is every piece of equipment. Then it needs to have access to the equipment that allows it to train to its directed mission. Then we have to site some equipment at the Mobilization Training Centers and at the Regional Training Centers to rationalize how they conduct training at the collective level when they have those opportunities. So that's a complex calculus I've just described, but it is the calculus that's the subset of equipping the Guard to a common MTO&E with the modernized, quite frankly as the Army has never been equipped to a common MTO&E. We've always, even in the active component, had some high/low mix. We went into this conflict in Iraq with five variants of tanks and five variants of Bradleys across the force. So it's just the nature of the beast.

We're always going to find ourselves in some high/low tech mix, and when we fill the Future Combat System we'll find ourselves with Future Combat System brigades, Stryker brigades, heavy brigades, infantry brigades, and somebody will have to call me, I'll be down on a veranda in Louisiana shelling purple hull peas, and tell me how it all came out. [Laughter]. But there's going to be a fairly long period of time before we would ever

would ever equip to a common MTO&E across the active component much less across the reserve and active. And by the time we get out to that point there's something else that's follow-on.

So the Guard's issues with respect to equipment are legitimate issues, but there is the kind of irrefutable fact that we're operating in a resource constrained environment. My view is we need to rationalize that. We need to understand precisely what their essential equipment requirements are then the source those essential equipment requirements.

Q: But you think it's about right right now with the Army providing [inaudible] to the Guard? You think that's working?

A: I'm not even going to comment on that because I'm not sure exactly what the mechanics are with regard to how money is flowed into the Guard for procurement.

Q: Back in the early '90s the active and the Guard, the Hatfields and McCoys, primarily over this issue as I remember it resourcing the Guard. It kind of had the potential to tear the total force apart. Isn't that what you're talking about here?

A: We've kind of focused our discussion on the Guard. There's another component out there, and that's the Reserve, which is federal structure. It is a little different than the Guard, in my view. Some people would take exception to this characterization, but because it's federal structured and because the commander of the USARC has directive authorities there are some benefits that accrue out of those arrangements. The Guard, because it is structured the way the Guard is, is more complex. So we tend to migrate into a discussion about the Guard.

Yes, there's been tension, particularly in that period of time that you described. And we could as a nation focus on these points of tension, but I would tell you that we probably need to tell the good story. We need to tell the good story of citizen soldiers who have stood and delivered now for six and a half years, many many multiple times. And sometimes people ask me, is the Army broken? My natural response is no, it's not broken. Because the Army, at the centerpiece of the Army is the soldier. The soldier is more skilled, better equipped, better trained, and better led today than ever before. We have far greater depth and abundance and richness of experience in our active component leadership than we have in my 38 years of service, and that same phenomena presents itself in the Guard and Reserve.

We've got a remarkable abundance of competent, seasoned, mature, experienced leadership that reside in our citizen soldier formations. So if you believe that the soldier is the centerpiece of the formation and the soldier is the ultimate expression of American resolving commitment, the Army's not broken.

Now if you move into a discussion about equipment, that's a different discussion. Because we have some broken equipment out there, and we do have an Army that's

stressed and stretched, and as our Chief of Staff of the Army suggests, is out of balance. And I do not take exception with that. But I will say to you that it is remarkable the quality of service being rendered by the young men and women who have chosen willingly to do the difficult and dangerous work of a free society.

Q: Sir, I'd like to come back to the impact of the change in the emphasis on the missions and what that does to training. It seems in some respects that if stability ops are to be regarded as parallel with main force operations, you're training challenges are more difficult. When it was just force on force, the graduate exercises, the NTC and whatever the country was, the 11th ACR out there--

A: [Inaudible].

Q: There we go. But when you were back still at Camp Swampy getting ready to go out there at the platoon and company level, you didn't need 11th ACR. You could do some amazingly realistic stuff and today with simulation.

It strikes me that when you're talking about stability ops, boy, the level of expertise you need when you're back home before you get out to fort Irwin, to realistically simulate the objective you've got to obtain, I mean you're dealing with people who need to play those roles and so on. It strikes me that that is a much more difficult--

A: It is. It is.

Q: What are you doing to handle that?

A: Well, you run into this dilemma of, I'm not sure where the term dwell came from. For two years I've been looking for the author, but no one has stepped forward and claimed authorship-- [Laughter].--because dwell is a term that is misleading. It suggests a level of activity that in no way, form or fashion describes the level of activity these units experience during their 12 month period after having been deployed. So these units are required to do a massive amount of activity in a very compressed period of time because some of these units are modernizing, some of these units are reorganizing, all of these units are struggling with many issues. Equipping issues. Now we get to the training piece of it because in order to be able to train you've got to have people. The people is really the pacing [inaudible] in all of this. So you have a very compressed period of time to train before you have to meet the LAD, which is the latest arrival date in the theater, and that's established by whom? It ain't established by me. [Laughter]. It's established by the combatant commander. But that's what drives this process. So there's, in a practical sense there's a very limited amount of time to train that formation for a very complex mission.

So what we used to do commonly in terms of home station training, we have difficulty achieving those same levels of training proficiencies, and that's just a function of time. But we do try to create opportunities for people to train in a [home] environment, so we

make available foreign language speakers, we make available cultural [load] players, but you cannot replicate the complexity of the contemporary operational environment at home station the way we attempt to replicate it at the RTC and the NTC.

The fact of the matter is we put significantly greater [inaudible] on our soldiers and our leaders to be more culturally astute and culturally aware. These are skills that [in appreciations] we didn't require our leaders to have at low levels in years past, but it is the coin of the realm in places like Afghanistan and Iraq today.

Q: How does that change, let's go to the high end, the graduation exercise, how does that change the observer controller role and the other sort of scoring systems you do at RJTC and NTC. Do you have to push that further down into the units to do the observations?

A: I guess desirable you might want to, but we don't have the resources to do that. So, and quite frankly, discussions of equipment notwithstanding, we've actually become fairly artful about maneuvering equipment to requirement. And that's across the components. We maneuver equipment to the requirement in ways that were not imagined five or six years ago. The far more difficult challenge, quite frankly, is manning. The manning challenge grows out of a host of phenomena. One, it grows out of the natural consequence of the surge when we accelerated five Brigade Combat Teams, combat aviation brigade and a division headquarters. We created a downstream manning challenge associated with the reinforcement.

We have requirements to man transition teams, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, and of course those requirements are for non-commissioned officers and company grade and field grade officers.

Q: [Inaudible] running out your ears.

A: We've gone to modular structures, and when we went to modular structures we increased the authorizations of captains and majors. And interestingly enough, there's been a proliferation of joint manning documents out there, so Multinational Force Iraq didn't exist seven years ago. These augmentations to a host of other organizations--there are 64 joint manning documents. And they're not looking for PFC Campbell, they're looking for Major Campbell, Lieutenant Colonel Campbell, Master Sergeant Campbell.

Then of course we've got about 12,000 or 13,000 soldiers now that are in our WTUs, and then there's a new additive requirement for TDA structure associated with manning of WTUs. And if things unfold as they're like to unfold and we have to reinforce recruiting command in the fourth quarter, which has been a common occurrence, then we'll see yet again another, albeit temporary claimant on manning that moves to that important requirement.

So when you get into some of our crown jewels line the NTC/JRTC, and many of them have been out there. There was a time when it was unthinkable that we would man them

at less than 105 percent but now it's common that they're manned at 75 percent. Whatever the number is. And the same thing is true of the BCT piece. So our ability to push that down is probably--

Q: In response to getting down to 12 month rotations, you said there will always be exceptions. Are you talking about would we after August have to go back to the days of selective extensions where some brigades get toward the end of the year and say surprise, you've got three more months.

A: I don't think that will occur.

Q: It would be that brigades going in would be said you're going to have a 15 month rotation?

A: No, I don't even think that will occur. I just know there's a huge complexity associated with it, and we're talking about moving probably in any given year 160 or 170,000 soldiers in and out of the theater. Somewhere in that complexity there's the platoon detachment that is a high demand/low density formation that may have to stay a little longer.

Q: Given the size of the Army now, not a future Army, how many brigades could be deployed overseas and still have that sort of ideal one year overseas, two years back home. How many can you deploy--

A: When we designed the ARFORGEN model, which is the Army's Force Generation Model, which was approved in concept by the Chief and then approved for execution by the Secretary less than two years ago, it was a supply-based model. The notion was that you would generate in each year more capability than there would be a demand for that capability. Well, that assumption was in very short order invalidated by the fact that demand conspicuously exceeded that level of supply. And again, we're dealing with brigade combat teams because it's an understandable entity. Quite frankly, brigade combat teams are the least complex formations to manage. It's the combat support, combat service support, it's these organizations that have, it's the request for forces that we don't have any organization that aligns to the request for forces so they have to be manufactured. They have to be engineered, if you will.

But if we're going to just stay on the brigade combat teams, and you grow the Army at some point to 48 brigade combat teams, then you would have 16 brigade combat teams available in any given year and then 16 brigade combat teams would be in the ready pool, and then 16 brigade combat teams would be in reset/train. So in that case if the requirement was less than 16 brigade combat teams, you could sustain a 1:2 indefinitely. And you would have the strategic flexibility associated with being able to reach back into the ready pool if a contingency presented itself.

You wed that to the 28 brigade combat teams of the National Guard and in each year in a

a 1:4 model you would have somewhere between five and six brigade combat teams available. That would say that in any year you would have in combination active component and National Guard somewhere between 23 and 24 brigade combat teams to meet combatant command requirements. That would be a pretty good deal.

Q: So that's the future. What about today?

A: Well the numbers are the numbers.

Q: You've got 42 for the active, is the number I was using instead of 48. What is the number I would use for the National Guard in terms of brigade combat teams that would be theoretically--

A: I would encourage you to use 28, but we're actually between, we're something greater than 28 because we're moving to 28 in the Guard.

Q: It's always very hard to use that number because it's not, in reality you can't, there are not 28 brigade combat teams in the National Guard that can be tapped for overseas duty right now, are there?

A: Well, we've tapped five this year and we're going to tap seven next year, next rotation. That represents a huge commitment on the part of the National Guard.

Now interestingly enough, those requirements were a little veiled because largely four of those brigade combat teams are going to deploy to do in lieu of missions. And the request for forces wasn't really for battalions and brigades, it was for this massive population of companies. And as we, for all the right reasons, the Guard was interested in rationalizing that in ways that allowed them to mobilize and deploy battalions and brigades. We work with 3rd Army and Multinational Corps Iraq to take this population of request for forces and rationalize it in a mission way, in a regional way, and in a temporal way. So that resulted in us mobilizing five brigades this year. Next year we're going to mobilize five brigades to perform what we refer to as the 4+1. That's the four brigades that are executing in lieu of missions. The brigade that's executing the Afghan National Army Phoenix Brigade requirement. And then we're going to mobilize two brigades to perform full spectrum [inaudible] operations.

So I don't know, I mean that represents a huge effort on the part of the Guard, and we keep talking about the Guard, but there is a commensurate effort on the part of the Reserve.

Q: Did you get your numbers right there? I think it was 40 and 28?

Q: I guess so. My only problem is if there's 42 things we should have 14 brigades available and then if you have five National Guard brigades available you've got 17 brigades to deploy. Isn't that pretty close to what's deployed now? How many in Iraq?

A: You have probably--

Q: I guess now because of the surge, but post-surge--

A: If you're talking about the surge you had--

Q: Minus two.

A: You had 18 in Iraq that were full spectrum; you had two in Afghanistan that were full spectrum, that was 20. Then you had ANA-21, then you had this veiled requirement which is another five, so you're up there around 26. Then we're the greatest nation in the world so it probably is in our best interest to have a force that we can deploy somewhere else besides Afghanistan and Iraq, so that's a GRF. So that's another number. Now all of you are familiar with the fact that in the theater you do a TOA and there's a temporal quality to it. It takes you about 45 days to do a TOA, so when you apply that requirement you're looking at a 48 brigade requirement every two years to be in a one [colon] war.

Q: That TOA never goes away, though, so you're always going to have that. I wonder if--

A: Right now, today, to meet that requirement you need 48 brigade combat teams. In the active component. And we've got 42. Now I know you all majored in journalism. Did any of y'all take any arithmetic at some point? [Laughter].

Q: It was not a requirement. [Laughter].

A: How do you reconcile the fact that you have a 48 brigade requirement and you've only got 42 brigades?

Q: That's a philosophy class. [Laughter].

A: You adjust your dwell and BOG ratios. That's how you get to a 15 month BOG. It's the arithmetic logic of saying this is the requirement, the demand, this is the supply, and the only way you can reconcile those is by deploying a formation for a longer period of BOG.

Q: I guess I'm just skeptical that those tours drop down even after the surge. I just don't see, the math doesn't work for me in terms of being able to come down to a year-long deployment.

A: It's not after the surge.

Q: After July.

A: It would be at the earliest, only at that point in August of formations deploying from August on, deployed for a 12 month BOG. Anybody deploying between now and August,

we're in a 15 month BOG. That's absent a combatant commander wanting to create some additional flexibility at the far side.

Q: So you won't be able to reduce probably the tours of any of those who are currently deployed for 15 to 12.

A: That's what the Chief wants to do, but that's in tension with a combatant commander who wants to maintain some

Flexibility. So it remains to be seen how all that will sort itself out.

Q: Let me get back to what you said earlier about the authority to call up the Guard and what not, whether or not you might need legislation relief or what. There's been a lot of move on Capitol Hill to give the Guard more authority. You actually mentioned the budget authority but [inaudible] in the '08 authorization bill [inaudible] to a four star and what not. Are you concerned that they might be going too far, and creating, giving the Guard too much authority that would hinder your ability to tap them for operations?

A: That's a discussion that occurs at a level that really is above my interest. My interest is in meeting the requirements. Whether or not people would argue whether or not we have access to the Guard or not, I would tell you that five brigade combat teams this year, seven brigade combat teams next year, the Guard is changing and delivering irrespective of the protocols and the authorities. The same thing is true of the USARC.

I think what you need to do, and this is what occurs, irrespective of the debate, what occurs is that thoughtful, reasonable, responsible people at the state, working with thoughtful, reasonable responsible people in 1st Army and thoughtful, reasonable, responsible people in installation management command, work to set the conditions to prepare a Guard formation or a Reserve formation during the period of pre-mobilization so that they enter into the mobilization site as well prepared as possible. What we do in pre-mobilization is rationalized with what we do in post-mobilization so that the period of post-mobilization training is as efficient as it can be because with the promulgation of the mobilization policy, January a year ago, we changed the variables and the constants in the calculus.

Heretofore the variable was the period of mobilization and the constant was BOG, 365 days. And that, quite frankly, made my life a lot easier because it's easier to source against a constant than it is to source against a variable. But now the variable, the period of mobilization, has become the constant. It's 365 days. And the elements of that are the period that is consumed in post-mobilization training and the period that is consumed in useable BOG. And it's in everybody's interest to try to extend the period of useable BOG and compress the period of post-mobilization training. To do that, you have to do more in pre-mobilization. What you do in pre-mobilization has to be rationalized so you're not redundant and repetitive in post-mobilization. So that you get maximum utilization in terms of BOG because as BOG is reduced, it takes more units, more

mobilizations, more post-mobilization periods, more deployments, more redeployments, more demobilizations to meet the same requirement. And so the Guard and the Reserve working with 1st Army and FORSCOM and with the states have worked pretty tirelessly to try to set the conditions so that we are training after mobilization for less periods of times than we were doing before this policy was promulgated. Does that make sense to you?

Q: Just a follow-up, earlier you mentioned using the reserve component like this for the next generation. Did you mean in terms of the sheer numbers of brigade combat teams being deployed by the seven for the Guard and--

A: I'm not sure what the requirements are going to be over the course of the next generation. I'm sure they'll wax and wane. And the degree to which they wax and wane, the demand/supply construct will alter. I just think, I participated in a forum several months ago and they brought in a bunch of people that were very very bright from a variety of disciplines--academia, the government, the military, some futurists. As you might imagine, they were asked to describe the world in 2019. So there's this very animated discussion about what the world might look like in 2019. And only one idea emerged where there was consensus. And that the United States would be in a condition of consistent conflict between now and 2019. That was the only point of consensus among a very broad population of very educated, erudite, thoughtful people.

So if you believe that to be the case and you think that the military instrument of national policy or power is going to be applied in some form or fashion, then you need to be attentive to how we might do that.

Now what we've also learned is that we need a whole of government approach. The application of the military instrument of national power is not sufficient. It has to be done in the context of the synergistic application of all our instruments of national power. And as the Secretary of Defense suggested in remarks not too very long ago, we're not too very well organized as a government to do that. So a lot that falls in what you described as this immense complexity has migrated to the Department of Defense that is more appropriately the province of other departments within the interagency.

Q: I just wanted to follow very briefly on something you mentioned earlier with a little bit of tension between the department and say the combatant commander in Iraq, where there interests may differ somewhat. You mentioned the combatant commander made a request, may seek more flexibility. But can you talk a little bit about where that flexibility is if you've got to go down to a fixed ratio of 1:1 [inaudible] 15 combat teams as of July. Where do you seek that flexibility?

A: First of all, the tension, I'm not sure, if there is tension it's healthy tension. It's the natural tension between a service chief, irrespective of a service that's trying to preserve and protect the equities of the service and reconcile those with the clear need to meet the validated claims of the combatant commander.

I don't know because it remains to be seen what assessments General Patraeus will make with regard to what he thinks is appropriate and how much flexibility he thinks is necessary and how you might generate that flexibility. So it's really, I'd just suggest to you that we'll have to wait and see. As you know, he has at least indicated the desire to have something of an operational pause after we move from 20 brigade combat teams, that includes two Marine regiments, to 15 brigade combat team level of effort in Iraq.

I think the question is as you move, it's within that movement what kind of flexibility he wants to retain and how that might impact specific brigades as it relates to dwell.

Q: Real quick on another subject, you talked about going from Guard and Reserve oriented toward strategic [inaudible] operational. What capacities do you lose when you organize and train to that standard in terms of being able to respond to the state [inaudible]?

A: I would actually suggest to you that you enhance your capacity to respond to the state requirement because you're better equipped, you've made a more significant investment in training, you're more ready. Right now the Guard is generally unready unless it is a Guard unit that has been notified for sourcing against a federal requirement, in which case you see this massive infusion of resources. I don't know that that condition is one that resonates very powerfully with the state governors who understandably have responsibilities to execute and want to have capable Guard forces that are responsive to their needs.

Q: I think we're out of time. We'll have to leave it there.

A: Okay.

Q: Thanks for coming in.

A: Thanks.

END TEXT