Enola Gay Archive

The Enola Gay and the Smithsonian

After "The Last Act" With Martin Harwit gone, the museum displayed the Enola Gay's forward fuselage, a propeller, and other components in a depoliticized exhibit. It drew four million visitors, the most ever for a special exhibit. (NASM photo by Carolyn Russo)

In 1994, the National Air and Space Museum and its parent organization, the Smithsonian Institution, planned to exhibit the Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, as a prop in a political horror show. It would have depicted Japan more as the victim instead of the aggressor in World War II.

However, the museum's plans were revealed by Air Force Magazine, the journal of the Air Force Association. A raging controversy ensued, and in response to public and Congressional outrage, the political exhibition was canceled in 1995 and the museum director was fired.

The Smithsonian Institution replaced the original exhibition with a straightforward program that eventually became the most popular exhibition in the museum's history.

The controversy never died. Books and articles continue to appear, many of them written by people who have not bothered to check the facts.

Here are the contemporary articles, reports, and documents - drawn upon by all parties to the controversy - that were the raw materials for the argument in 1994 and 1995.

Here also is the complete report, "The Smithsonian and the Enola Gay," published by the Air Force Association in April 2004.

Chronology of the Controversy

Revisionism Gone Wrong

A collection of Air Force Association reports, analyses and articles, ranging from March 1994 to December 1996 --

Part 1 Special reports and analyses

Part 2 Articles and editorials

The Airplane

The Crew

The Atom Bomb

The Mission

Recommended Reading and Web Site Links

Frequently Asked Questions

Verbatim

Too High a Risk?
"This issue is not about contractor 'A' or contractor 'B.' The issues is that we do not believe that it is prudent for up to 80 to 90 percent of the fighter fleet to be dependent on a single engine type, provided by one manufacturer. Being tied to one engine is too high an operational risk to take."
—Rep. Neil Abercrombie (D-Hawaii), explaining why his House Armed Services Air and Land Forces Subcommittee had added funds to the 2010 defense budget to cover continued development of an alternate engine for the F-35, committee markup session, June 16, 2009.

Verbatim

You Betcha
"Your decision to terminate the acquisition of the C-17s, the F- 22s, the DDG-1000, and the Future Combat System vehicles—we have concerns that it may send the wrong signal to our friends and our potential aggressors that we are reducing our capability. It may also have a long-term impact on our defense industrial base. It may diminish our capacity to provide deterrents and reduce our strength that we provide to our allies. We hope that this is not the consequence, but some of us are concerned."
—Sen. Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), parting remarks to Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Adm. Michael Mullen, Joint Chiefs Chairman, during a Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing, June 9, 2009.