In a bit more than 11 weeks, NATO forces flew about 35,000 sorties, of which about 10,000 were attack sorties. The first phase of the air war was tentative, featuring limited attacks and vague objectives. In time, NATO shifted gears and stepped up the daily number of sorties. By the end of the war, NATO strike aircraft were flying nearly 400 missions on some days. Information on sorties remains incomplete. Poor weather caused aborts of many missions on some days.

The information on these pages is preliminary and drawn from several official sources, primarily NATO and Defense Department briefings presented almost daily during the war. Several different US and Alliance entities are conducting reviews, with sometimes significant variations in data.

NATO struck (and restruck) a variety of targets in Serbia, which were deemed "strategic" targets, and in Kosovo, which were considered "tactical." Some targets were hit by many different aircraft in a single raid. At first, NATO confined its attacks to a limited number of target groups. Day by day, the Alliance broadened the scope of its campaign. Strategic targets fell into six categories, as shown below.

NATO encountered difficulty locating and destroying mobile systems. By the time the Allies suspended bombing operations, officials thought they had destroyed considerable amounts of artillery and armored vehicles and were starting to consistently hit Serbian tanks. Definitive numbers weren't yet determined. Numbers at right were provided by DoD on June 10 and subsequently confirmed by Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

NATO fairly quickly achieved air superiority, neutralizing the fighter and missile elements of Yugoslavia's integrated air defense system. Most of the time, the Serbs declined to turn on their tracking radars for fear of drawing an attack. Many systems remained in operation, however, and NATO remained wary until the end of the conflict. DoD said NATO pilots observed nearly 700 firings of SAMs, some of which could not be identified by type.

Attacks from the air took a heavy toll on military-related industry and lines of communications. Yugoslavia's refining industry virtually ceased to exist. The 3rd Army in Kosovo, responsible for the bulk of the atrocities, suffered the loss of 60 percent of its barracks, headquarters, storage sites, and other facilities. Power was turned off in as much as 80 percent of Serbia at a time.

On March 24, the number of NATO aircraft committed to the air campaign numbered 400, of which 120 were strike aircraft. By the end of the war, the numbers were 883 and 550, respectively. US forces provided 581, or about 66 percent of the total. With the larger fleet, NATO commanders began to hit Serb assets with strikes from multiple directions and around the clock.