

# Quadrennial Defense Review Report



February 2010



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# A DEFENSE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

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The depth, scope, and scale of activities that the Department of Defense undertakes every day are unparalleled. From employing forces in operations around the world, to providing education, health care, and housing for our people, to researching, developing, testing, and fielding new technologies, the Department has a unique set of global responsibilities.

As described earlier, defense strategy requires making choices: accepting and managing risk is thus inherent in everything the Department does. Although difficult, risk management is central to effective decision-making and is vital to our success. For our nation, it can mean the difference between victory and defeat; for our men and women in uniform and their families, such decisions have life-and-death consequences. That is why the Department is focused so centrally on rebalancing our capabilities and reforming our institutions to better enable success in today's wars while preparing for a wide range of contingencies.

Effectively managing risk across such a vast enterprise is difficult; the range and volume of component activities and competencies defy simple identification, categorization, and aggregation of risk. Moreover, a dynamic security environment requires the Department to be flexible and diminishes the value of formulaic risk assessments. Taken together, the challenges associated with measuring risk and performance relegate the use of quantitative metrics to an important but supporting role: in any risk assessment, DoD necessarily places a premium on informed judgment at all echelons of command.

In assessing risk for this QDR, the Department used a multidisciplinary approach. The assessment reflects updated thinking on best practices, which increasingly not only draws on quantitative analysis, but also relies on informed judgments, expert opinions, and the use of scenarios. The Department ensured that its risk assessment was strategy driven. Our efforts were informed by recent risk identification efforts conducted by various components of the Department, including the DoD Inspector General and by the Government Accountability Office.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> The GAO produces an annual list of high-risk management issues in the U.S. government, and in 2009 eight applied to DoD: supply chain management, weapon systems acquisition, contract management, financial management, business systems modernization, support infrastructure management, approach to business transformation, and the Personnel Security Clearance Program. The DoD Inspector General summary of management and performance challenges for FY 2009 also identified eight risk areas for the Department: financial management; acquisition process and contract management; joint warfighting and readiness; information assurance, security, and privacy; health care; equipping and training Iraqi and Afghan security forces; the nuclear enterprise; and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.

As a framework to organize its assessment, the 2010 QDR used risk categories, described below, that have been employed since 2001:

- *Operational risk*: the ability of the current force to execute strategy successfully within acceptable human, materiel, financial, and strategic costs. Consideration of operational risk requires assessing the Department's ability to execute current, planned, and contingency operations in the near term.
- *Force management risk*: our ability to recruit, retain, train, educate, and equip the All-Volunteer Force, and to sustain its readiness and morale. This requires the Department to examine its ability to provide trained and ready personnel in the near term, midterm, and long term.
- *Institutional risk*: the capacity of management and business practices to plan for, enable, and support the execution of DoD missions. It encompasses the ability to develop effective and efficient organizations and processes over the near term, midterm, and long term.
- *Future challenges risk*: the Department's capacity to execute future missions successfully, and to hedge against shocks. Here most consideration is given to the Department's ability to field superior capabilities and sufficient capacity to deter/defeat emerging threats in the midterm and long term.

Ongoing efforts to rebalance the joint force, including those taken during the course of this QDR, help better position DoD not only to prevail across a range of missions but to do so in the challenging current and likely future security environment. However, existing and emerging issues could complicate the Department's ability to execute the defense strategy. Therefore, on the basis of an enterprise-wide review, this QDR risk assessment identifies those key shortfalls or complex problems that threaten the Department's ability to successfully execute its priority objectives, and that consequently require the sustained attention of DoD's senior leadership.

### *Operational Risk*

Key issues that pose risk to operational missions in the near term include providing sufficient enabling capabilities, building partnership capacity, and securing DoD systems in cyberspace.

A failure to provide sufficient enablers would constrain ongoing operations in multiple ways and would constitute particular risk to achieving the near-term goals of prevailing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Key capability enablers are currently stressed and will remain so in the near- to midterm environment because they play a critical and potentially growing role in ongoing operations. Examples detailed previously include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), vertical lift and associated logistics assets, electronic warfare, and language and culture skills, along with

special operations forces enablers. DoD continues to work toward filling persistent gaps. Drawing on the results of the QDR's analysis, the Department has identified enabling capabilities that are useful in a wide range of operations and intends to make continued investments in them. But despite these efforts to reduce stress on enablers across the FYDP, this risk could worsen over time given the projected demands in the future security environment.

Allies and both international and interagency partners are critical to success in meeting today's security challenges. Overseas, the inability or unwillingness of international partners to support shared goals or provide access would place additional operational risk on U.S. forces and would threaten our ability to prevail in current or future conflicts. Building the defense capacity of allies

and partners and ensuring that the U.S. Armed Forces are able to effectively train and operate with foreign militaries is a high-priority mission. As the emphasis on developing the capability of indigenous security forces in Afghanistan and Iraq reflects, conducting security force assistance (SFA) operations is an increasingly critical element of building partnership capacity. In anticipation of the growing role of security force assistance in U.S. strategy and operations, the Department is institutionalizing general purpose force capabilities for security force



*U.S. Navy Chief Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician Kenneth Simpson, right, discusses disposal techniques with Philippine Chief Inspector Eric Maniego, with the National Police Maritime Group Special Reaction Unit, at Crow Valley, Philippines, March 25, 2009. U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Spec. 2nd Class Aaron Burden.*

assistance; enhancing language, regional, and cultural abilities; strengthening and expanding capabilities for training partner aviation forces, as well as capacities for ministerial-level training; and creating mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical materiel. Working with interagency partners and with Congress, DoD is also exploring how to improve the ways in which security assistance funds are authorized and overseen within the executive branch to enhance their effectiveness in supporting national security goals.

A failure by the Department to secure its systems in cyberspace would pose a fundamental risk to our ability to accomplish defense missions today and in the future. Attacks in cyberspace could target command and control systems and the cyberspace infrastructure supporting weapons system platforms. To ensure unfettered access to cyberspace, DoD mission-critical systems and networks must perform and be resilient in the face of cyberspace attacks. The recent

establishment of U.S. Cyber Command is a critical step forward. In addition, the Department is taking steps to identify mission-critical command and control systems and networks, examining how best to further protect them, and exploring ways to develop operational approaches and logistics that better address potential vulnerabilities. The Department is also actively participating in a broader interagency approach for securing cyberspace, including the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). To ensure that U.S. Armed Forces are properly trained and equipped to counter this threat, the Department must develop and maintain the ability to accurately assess the performance of network-enabled information systems in realistic threat environments.

### *Force Management Risk*

Key issues in force management include supporting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, providing health care to DoD personnel, and ensuring the proper mix and roles of the Active Component and Reserve Component.

The scale and duration of concurrent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq are placing a considerable strain on individual service members and their families, on the overall health of the All-Volunteer Force, and on our ability to reset and reconstitute it. Because it has been engaged in war for eight years, the Department has been unable to maintain desired deployment to dwell ratios. In the near term to midterm, this high operational tempo requires DoD to pay extra attention to the well-being of our service members, their families, and institutions. The Department is continually measuring rates of suicide and divorce, among a range of other indicators, to identify strains on the health of the force. DoD assesses these data against national benchmarks and Service-specific trends. Although the Department is currently meeting its targets for recruitment and retention, for instance, we continue to closely monitor these numbers. The drawdown in Iraq, coupled with increased requirements in Afghanistan, will dictate the pace of movement toward more sustainable dwell rates. Demand for support, however, is an enduring need that will not end with withdrawal of service members from combat. It is critical that an extensive, institutionalized system of support for the All-Volunteer Force be strengthened and sustained. The Army's Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, which seeks to place equal importance on mental and physical fitness, is one initiative toward that end. Similarly, the Marine Corps' Combat Operational Stress Control Program aims at equipping leaders with the skills to identify and address signs of stress. In the midterm to long term, the Department's new force-sizing construct and its approach to planning and executing operations will seek to better account for the demands made on the All-Volunteer Force by long-duration operations.

Over the long term, rising costs and continuing pressures threaten the Department's approach to providing high-quality health care to members of the U.S. Armed Forces, veterans, and their dependents. Although achievement of this objective is not at immediate risk, an increasing

number of military health system users, steady cost shares/co-pays, and congressionally mandated benefit increases have all increased the Department's health care costs well beyond the programmed budget. Continued engagement in long-duration operations and a growing number of veterans approaching 65 years of age will further increase DoD costs. DoD continues to identify efficiencies that can reduce cost growth while sustaining high-quality care.

The critical contribution made by the Reserve Component in recent years—currently 25 to 30 percent of U.S. Central Command forces—has led to increased capability and heightened readiness. Significant reductions in use of the RC following the drawdown in Iraq and efforts to reset the force will necessitate a thorough assessment of RC readiness and future roles. The Department has already initiated several studies examining issues associated with employing the RC on a routine, rotational basis as part of the total operational force, changing the AC/RC mix, and/or changing the role of the RC. Drawing on this work, the Department will explore the potential to redefine the role of the RC for both domestic and overseas operations.

### *Institutional Risk*

Key issues that pose institutional risk include reforming general acquisition processes, optimizing information technology acquisition processes, and maintaining the defense industrial base.

Shortcomings in the acquisition process put the Department at risk of being unable to deliver the capabilities it needs, when it needs them, and at acceptable costs, and these potential failures in turn threaten the successful execution of military operations. The Department's acquisition and support processes have rightly received consistent criticism for delays, cost growth, an overstretched workforce, and other inefficiencies. Given the importance of a healthy acquisition process, we must not embark on programs with artificially low cost estimates, immature designs and technology, fluid requirements, excessive technical authority certification requirements, unstable budgets, and unsustainable procurement profiles. The December 2008 release of DoD Directive 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," seeks to mitigate key risks associated with the acquisition process. The Department will closely track implementation of new policies instituted by the directive aimed at ensuring more rigorous assessment of alternatives, competitive prototyping, more frequent and effective program reviews, the prevention of requirements creep, independent assessment of "technology readiness," and better methods of testing and evaluation. We must also ensure that the Department is able to rapidly create prototypes and field new capabilities, maximizing its ability to meet warfighter needs and leverage technological advantages. By 2015, the Department also plans to hire 20,000 new acquisition professionals, filling 9,000 new jobs and 11,000 converted contractor positions.

The Department's deliberate acquisition process is especially poorly suited for keeping pace with innovations in information technology (IT). The inability to acquire powerful IT solutions in an economical manner hampers the Department's efforts to use information as a force multiplier to

ensure and enhance agility, flexibility, responsiveness, and effectiveness. This results in an enduring missed opportunity to benefit more fully from DoD, interagency, and international IT capabilities. The Department must reform the IT acquisition process, drawing on successful commercial practices, with a view to accelerating the acquisition cycle.

The Department's need for a robust defense industrial base with appropriate levels of competition, innovation, and industrial capacity represents another area of institutional risk. Since World War II, the U.S. defense industry has consolidated and contracted around 20th century platforms. The U.S. defense industry is, accordingly, not well-positioned to meet the Department's 21st century requirements. This creates risk that extends not only to the relatively small number of major, established providers of defense platforms but also to a much larger community of product providers. Working closely with international partners and industry, the Department will strive to better ensure that its future requirements can be met. Such an approach should not, however, include underwriting sunset industries or sustaining poor business models—courses of action that simply exacerbate risk to the equipping of the U.S. military.

### *Future Challenges Risk*

Preceding sections highlighted numerous challenges and opportunities in the security environment. Other major issues that pose future challenges include managing uncertainty about the future environment and science and technology (S&T) trends.

Difficulties in anticipating the nature of the future security environment create the risk that the Department may not be adequately prepared for threats that materialize over the midterm to long term. To better hedge against the uncertainty inherent in long-term defense planning, the Department drew on a wide range of analyses—including the use of multiple scenarios and combinations of scenarios—to inform its judgments for this QDR. DoD also benefited from analysis on the likely future security environment produced by the U.S. intelligence community. DoD intends to further refine this analytic process, making it more iterative and adaptive, and leveraging the results of experimentation and alternative futures analysis to enhance efforts to manage future risk.

A number of factors related to research and development will, over time, generate increased risk to America's technological edge. As global research and development (R&D) investment increases, it is proving increasingly difficult for the United States to maintain a competitive advantage across the entire spectrum of defense technologies. Even at current, relatively robust levels of investment, the DoD S&T program is struggling to keep pace with the expanding challenges of the evolving security environment and the increasing speed and cost of global technology development. The Department's options for managing risk with respect to S&T must be synchronized with efforts by other agencies as well as the private sector. The health of the U.S. R&D base is well beyond the mission of an individual department; it is also driven by

commercial and academic interests beyond the direct influence of DoD spending. To assure future technology competence, the Department will continue to be a leading proponent of education standards and opportunities relevant to the technology requirements to enhance national security. The Department will consider the scope and potential benefits of an R&D strategy that prioritizes those areas where it is vital to maintain a technological advantage. This effort will be coupled with further work to assess how best to work with the academy and industry, as well as key international allies to leverage breakthroughs and avoid duplication.

### *Strategic, Military, and Political Risk*

In the face of ongoing war and a range of pressing current and future challenges, the United States requires a defense strategy and portfolio of military resources that can help protect and advance the nation's interests. To create and maintain the right mix of forces and military capability, the Department must make hard, strategy-informed choices. To do so, it must determine where to invest additional resources and where to accept and manage a degree of operational, force management, institutional and future challenge risk over the near and longer-term. These judgments inform our broader consideration of strategic, military, and political risks, as required by Title 10 legislation.

In the 2010 QDR risk assessment, strategic risk constitutes the Department's ability to execute the defense priority objectives in the near term, midterm, and long term in support of national security. Military risk encompasses the ability of U.S. forces to adequately resource, execute, and sustain military operations in the near- to midterm, and the mid- to longer term. In the international context, political risk derives from the perceived legitimacy of our actions and the resulting impact on the ability and will of allies and partners to support shared goals. In the domestic context, political risk relates to public support of national strategic priorities and the associated resource requirements in the near term, midterm, and long term.

This QDR identified areas of weakness in our defense program, presented options to mitigate them, and made recommendations on where and how to rebalance the Department toward our most pressing challenges. The risks identified in this section will require sustained leadership attention in order to ensure that they are successfully managed and mitigated. The QDR risk assessment concludes that the Department is positioned to successfully balance overarching strategic, military, and political risk between the near to midterm and the mid- to long term, as well as across the full range of military missions required to protect and advance national interests.



## CONCLUSION: THE WAY AHEAD

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This QDR report and the preceding months of deliberation served two purposes: first, to establish the Department's key priority objectives, providing strategic context and recommendations on key capability development and investment priorities; and second, to communicate the Secretary's intent for the next several years of the Department's work. The QDR serves as a capstone institutional document, shaping how the Department of Defense will support America's military personnel today, while building the policy and programmatic foundation that will enable the next generation to protect the American people and advance their interests.

The challenges facing the United States are immense, but so are the opportunities. This QDR clarified the Secretary's priority objectives for the Department: prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. The Secretary has been clear, and this report reaffirms the need to manage risk prudently across these objectives in favor of prevailing in today's wars—it has outlined in detail how the Department intends to further rebalance its capabilities and reform its institutions in order to do so.

Strategy-driven, this QDR provided an assessment of the strategic environment, America's national interests and global role, the role of U.S. military power, and a comprehensive description of the Department's strategy and the implications for capability development, key policies and authorities, and our key defense relationships at home and abroad.

This report will be used to shape and influence a series of ongoing processes and reviews that provide direction to Department of Defense components. The strategic and investment priorities described in this report reflect the Secretary's intent as the Department continues to reform and rebalance the U.S. military to better enable success in today's wars while preparing for tomorrow's threats.





**CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**Subject: Chairman's Assessment of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)**

- 1. In accordance with title 10, United States Code, Section 118, I forward my assessment of the 2010 QDR for inclusion in the subject report.**
- 2. From my perspective, the QDR takes positive steps to support the Department's efforts to rebalance the force and reform processes. It provides needed focus on improving stability and defending our vital interests in the Middle East and South Asia, as well as continuing to be good stewards of the health of the force and balancing global strategic risk.**

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "M. G. Mullen", is positioned above the printed name. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

**M. G. MULLEN**  
**Admiral, United States Navy**



# CHAIRMAN'S ASSESSMENT OF 2010 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW

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The QDR identifies initiatives and areas for focus that address my top priorities: improving stability and defending our vital interests in the Middle East and South Asia, remaining good stewards for the health of the force, and balancing global strategic risk.

## **Winning Today's Fight: Vital Interests in the Middle East and South Asia**

The QDR places appropriate priority on our mission to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda globally and particularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and to prevent it from threatening America and our allies in the future. We must continue to find new ways to meet the pressing needs of our forces engaged in these important operations as we complete a responsible drawdown in Iraq and implement the new strategy in Afghanistan.

The QDR supports investment in many critical enablers that have been persistently short in our inventory. Examples include rotary wing aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, counter-improvised explosive device capabilities, Special Operations Forces, Civil Affairs, language and cultural expertise, and capabilities that will enable increased Security Force Assistance activities. The QDR also recognized the need to expand our electronic warfare capabilities and enhance intelligence and information operations capabilities. These key capabilities, as well as new technologies being explored, support flexible and effective forces for today's fight and contribute to our readiness for operations across the full range of military operations.

I remain concerned about the nuclear ambitions and confrontational postures of Iran and North Korea. The QDR emphasizes the President's focus on engagement and reinforces our efforts to work with allies and partners to prevent global nuclear proliferation, regardless of origin. At the same time, it addresses the need for investment in developing appropriate counter-WMD measures and consequence management responses. It also calls for expanding our capabilities to detect and secure uncontrolled weapons of mass destruction and related materials, as well as the need to enhance nuclear forensics – both of which are vital to our national interests.

I applaud the QDR's focus on rapidly providing our warfighters with essential capabilities, and I am convinced that innovative commercial technology solutions and streamlined developmental efforts can and will be applied to ongoing operations.

## **Health of the Force**

I emphatically support the QDR's focus on preserving and enhancing the all-volunteer force as the foundation of our military. The men and women of our Armed Forces, as well as their families, are America's greatest strategic assets, and as such, we must do all we can to preserve

their quality of service and honor their commitment. As we finish well in Iraq and shift the main effort to Afghanistan, we have the opportunity to begin resetting and reconstituting our units and, as dwell time increases, reduce stress on our service members and their families.

The QDR advocates important initiatives for improving the health of the force. These initiatives will enhance warrior and survivor care and provide a single medical record for our service members throughout their lives. The QDR reinforces the urgency to increase research and treatment for a broad range of injuries, especially the signature wounds of Post Traumatic Stress



*U.S. Navy Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reenlists ten soldiers assigned to 2/5 Stryker Brigade stationed at Forward Operating Base Frontenac in Kandahar, Afghanistan, December 17, 2009. DoD photo by Mass Communication Spec. 1st Class Chad J. McNeeley.*

and Traumatic Brain Injuries. Increased rates of combat stress, substance abuse, and suicide point to a force that is under a high degree of pressure from repeated long deployments and limited time at home. Reducing deployment time and increasing time at home, as appropriate for each component, are important for reintegrating our service members returning from a combat environment to routine activities at home. Though the force has remained incredibly resilient over the course of eight years of

war, we must prioritize programs that sustain resiliency such as: child care facilities, quality education for children, 24/7 family support assistance, outreach to Guard and Reserve members and their families, and referrals for non-medical counseling. By emphasizing the emotional, social, spiritual and family aspects of fitness, these health-of-the-force investments will pay dividends in national security today and well into the future.

The Reserve Component plays a vital role in meeting our defense missions and in enabling us to manage stress on the active force. In short, we could not have accomplished what we have these past eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard forces. I applaud the QDR report's commitment to conduct a comprehensive assessment of Reserve Component policies. In that review, it is important that we consider the proper balance of maintaining the operational capabilities and strategic depth of the Reserve Component as an integrated force to meet requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. Access to the Reserve Component remains a critical lever for meeting global operational demands without substantially increasing the size of the active force.

I also strongly endorse the QDR's efforts to address joint force readiness for the full range of challenges we face. The focus is on building joint force capability and capacity for irregular

warfare without compromising our conventional and nuclear superiority. Although we have always retained sufficient capacity and capability to address the entire spectrum of threats, an aggressive and sustained tempo of operations has necessitated prioritizing training and readiness for current missions over other types of operations. With the drawdown in Iraq and appropriate time and resources provided for reset and reconstitution of the force, our readiness and availability to counter multiple, wide-ranging challenges will increase and we will move toward desired goals for force rotation. Many elements of the joint force will remain in high demand in the near term, and will continue to reset in stride between deployments. We must continue our progress towards a properly balanced force.

Reset and prepositioned stock replacement are two crucial issues for maintaining readiness. We need to reset equipment that is lost in combat and repair or replace equipment degraded by wear and tear, with full restoration not expected until years after OIF and OEF are completed. Ensuring funding for related activities, such as depot operations, is essential for maintenance of the force. And the enormity of the equipment and unit reset challenge, as we withdraw from Iraq and increase efforts in Afghanistan, will require continuous review of our joint requirements and timelines. In the mid to long term, it is imperative that we have a robust industrial base with sufficient manufacturing capability and capacity to preserve our technological edge and provide for the reset and recapitalization of our force.

### **Properly Balance Global Strategic Risk**

My assessment of risk in the QDR is based on a realistic understanding of the security environment which remains complex, dynamic, and uncertain. While defense analysis identifies trends, it is problematic to predict the time, place, and nature of future challenges. The QDR force planning construct is properly focused on balancing capabilities to fight today's wars with those needed to counter future potential adversaries. It enables us to build a ready and agile force with sufficient capacity and capability to defeat adversaries across the range of military operations. And finally, it places priority on our ability to defend the homeland and support civil authorities.

We expect to be increasingly challenged in securing and maintaining access to the global commons and must also be prepared for operations in unfamiliar conditions and environments. The QDR gives solid direction on developing capabilities that counter the proliferation of anti-access and area-denial threats, which present an increased challenge to our maritime, air, space, and cyber forces. Our national strategy also depends on our ability to rapidly project forces and resupply globally, giving us the ability to provide our operational commanders with forces and logistics superiority when and where needed. Furthermore, while we have better organized our forces to operate in the cyber domain, the QDR highlights the need to break down institutional barriers and ensure our cyber capabilities receive the support necessary to properly provide our

national security. In addition, the QDR initiated important efforts to explore requirements involving long-range strike capabilities, enhancing the protection of our valuable assets, accelerating the development of unmanned systems across components, and improving our integrated missile defenses. The QDR reinforces developing flexible and adaptable regional deterrence which includes missile defense.

I fully support the QDR's increased emphasis on the important roles of our interagency and international partners in achieving our desired end states and helping to balance global risk. No one – and certainly no one military – can do it alone. We must strive to develop a better understanding of the roles, missions, and authorities of departments and organizations within the U.S. government and to minimize friction and duplicative efforts. This concern is particularly acute in the areas of cyber, space operations, and homeland security where the interests of many government departments intersect. Although our joint force must retain the capacity to act decisively when appropriate, we prefer to partner and work with others in major operations across a wide range of contingencies. Building the capacity of our partners to deter and prevent conflict makes them more capable of providing assistance as we address common threats together. Increasing the capacity of our partners and increasing the sharing of information are important national security investments. If partners are unable to build the needed capability or capacity, however, our joint force must be able to shoulder the security burden when directed.

I strongly agree with the QDR's vision of a globally engaged force that supports the development of security forces and conducts necessary operations against violent extremists around the world, in addition to other operations. To meet this goal, we must maintain appropriate force levels and expertise. This will require allocation of sufficient resources to maintain the correct balance of capabilities and capacity within the joint force. As we apply resources, we will prioritize readiness and capability over capacity.

The QDR assessed regional posture requirements measured against global strategic and policy expectations. This approach leverages key capabilities, that are prepositioned, rotational, and forward-stationed, to maximize the benefits of presence in a region while ensuring the capability to meet warfighting demands globally. This tailored approach to force posture assures allies and deters potential aggressors, while maintaining appropriate force levels in the continental United States to support critical defense and civil support missions at home and for expeditionary global response. Our strategy supports the development of a tailored posture in the broader Middle East and Central and South Asia, promotes a peaceful and stable Asia-Pacific region, and reaffirms our commitment to NATO and Europe.

## Conclusion

U.S. Armed Forces can perform the missions called for in the QDR. Within this mission set, two strategic imperatives require our immediate attention. First, we must disrupt, dismantle, and

defeat al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan while acting against its global affiliates, and prevent its capacity to threaten the United States and our allies. Second, we must continue to prevent and deter conflict in strategically important regions, including those involving Iran and North Korea. Our success in these and other missions depends upon obtaining sufficient, timely funding to reset the force and restore readiness and a responsible withdrawal from Iraq.

Managing risk under the new QDR force planning construct requires further analysis, including new scenarios to test joint concepts of operation and force mixes and the development of associated operational and strategic assumptions. Our planning and assessment efforts will vary the size, duration, and simultaneity of operations and account for associated policies and goals for force rotation, disengagement, and access to the Reserve Component.

Overall, the QDR provides an accurate depiction of our future national security requirements. Our challenge as a nation will be to properly resource these priorities.